The Secretary of State was asked—

Shaun Woodward: The report has taken more than 10 years to produce, and it has cost nearly £200 million, half of which has been spent on legal aid. The report has been crucial to the peace process, and we will study its findings carefully. I say that because I think that the House will want a debate on it, and the Government would want to grant it a debate on the report and its findings.

Shaun Woodward: In answering the hon. Gentleman's third question, may I associate myself firmly with the remarks made in his two previous ones? In response to his third question, I urge him to read the IMC report, which makes it clear that such activity cannot be attributed to the organised activities of those who may have represented paramilitary activity in the past. The report is extremely clear in laying the blame where it appropriately lies, particularly with the so-called RIRA and CIRA—Real IRA and Continuity IRA. Those groups are extremely dangerous, and a political solution is pressed as a matter of urgency.

Shaun Woodward: The hon. Gentleman will understand why I may not wish to speak about the particular individuals who have been charged with the murder of Constable Carroll, but I will say that the IMC report—I urge all hon. Members to read it—is very clear about where some of the recruitment, particularly of young males, is coming from and why it is happening. Within the report, there is also a proposal for a political intervention, which the IMC believes would be potent in having an effect on these people.

Alistair Carmichael: May I associate myself with the remarks of the Secretary of State and the IMC report—that the devolution of criminal justice would indeed be "a potent intervention" that politicians could effect in dealing with dissident republican groups? Does he agree with me and those with whom I am associated in Northern Ireland that, in the long term, these groups will be countered only if we are able to pursue an agenda of shared futures?

Owen Paterson: On the conclusion that the report endorses the devolution of policing, the Opposition have always taken a responsible approach. We support the devolution of policing and justice, and we supported the Bill in March. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has confirmed our long-term commitment to the significant financial package proposed by the Government. We have always made clear that devolution should happen only when all parts of the community are supportive—

Paul Goggins: It is important that those organisations take down their command structures and desist from criminality, and that the Ulster Defence Association in particular moves to complete the decommissioning process it has begun—certainly no later than February next year, when the powers run out. I am particularly concerned about the increase, reported today by the IMC, in the number of paramilitary-style attacks in loyalist areas this year: already more than double the number last year. These people must stop taking the law into their own hands, and let the police and the courts do their job.

Paul Goggins: There is certainly absolutely no intention whatever to bin—as the hon. Gentleman puts it—the work of the Consultative Group on the Past. The work it has done has been very important. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State opened up a further consultation on its recommendations. That consultation is now completed.  [Interruption.] We are considering the outcome of the 230 representations that were made as part of that consultation, and we will publish a summary of those responses in due course.  [Interruption.]

Shaun Woodward: It is for the parties in Northern Ireland to decide when to request transfer. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made a settlement of upwards of £800 million available to the parties if they reach agreement.

The Prime Minister was asked—

Gordon Brown: Before listing my engagements, I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in sending our condolences to the families and friends of the five soldiers who died in Afghanistan yesterday—three soldiers from the Grenadier Guards and two soldiers from the Royal Military Police. The death of five brave soldiers in a single incident is a terrible and tragic loss, and I want to pay tribute, as the whole House will, to their professionalism, and to their courage and service. Our thoughts must also be with the five additional members of our armed forces who were seriously injured in the same incident yesterday. Evidence is now being assembled, but it appears that they were targeted because they were engaged in what our enemies fear most—they were mentoring and strengthening Afghan forces to make Afghanistan more secure. While we will step up and strengthen our security wherever we can, we will not stop doing what the Afghan Taliban fear most. The sacrifice of our military is great and our resolve must match it.
	This morning, I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others, and, in addition to my duties in the House, I shall have further such meetings today.

Gordon Brown: We will not only make promises to improve cancer care in the national health service, we will deliver on these promises. We will not only have a two-week maximum before people can see a consultant, we will move to a one-week maximum before people can actually have the diagnostic tests they need. However, I think that people should be warned about the national health service, because the shadow Health Secretary said yesterday—

David Cameron: Everyone will agree with what the Prime Minister said about working with the police, but clearly the attack raises questions about the infiltration of the Afghan police by criminals, drug dealers and militants. In evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Afghan police force was described as
	"one of the most dysfunctional institutions in the country",
	with reports that the police were actively involved in criminal activities, including the drugs trade. We all agree on a more focused and targeted mission in Afghanistan, and at the heart of that mission, as the Prime Minister has just said, is training Afghans to take more responsibility for their security. Given that, what more can he say about the efforts to clean up an organisation—the Afghan national police—that is essential to the success of our strategy but still seems to be going so wrong?

David Cameron: Clearly what the Prime Minister says is right, although he has in the past said that the Afghan police are not seen as a fair part of the Afghan state and so progress needs to be made. Our armed forces will also need to have every confidence that stronger economic development and political effort will go in behind them. Does the Prime Minister agree that it is perhaps time, once again, to return to the idea of a single, strong co-ordinating figure—not just from the United Nations but someone who works across the coalition, including with the Afghan Government and NATO—to deliver this effort more effectively than anyone has done so far? Is it his understanding that that is being considered in Washington and should be part of the revised strategy that we hope that President Obama and his team will announce shortly?

David Cameron: A day when we hear the news of such an appalling incident in Afghanistan is not one for obsessing about the internal workings of Parliament and the House of Commons, but is it not important that today we accept in full Sir Christopher Kelly's report? Does the Prime Minister agree that, in accepting the report, it is important that we say that, from now and into the future, Members of Parliament should not vote on our pay, expenses, pensions, terms of service, resettlement or expenses packages? Is not that an essential part of restoring faith in Parliament and politics—and in this House of Commons, which all of us care about?

Gordon Brown: rose—

Gordon Brown: Yes, Mr. Speaker. The Government will work in concert with the other 26 countries of the European Union. We will work with them on the same policies to bring about economic recovery and to bring down unemployment in our country, and we will work for greater international co-ordination. We will not make iron-cast guarantees that are broken— [ Interruption. ]

Nicholas Clegg: Mr. Speaker— [ Interruption. ]

Gordon Brown: President Karzai said yesterday at his press conference that he was going to operate a policy in which there would be a clean-up of politics in Afghanistan. We will now have to test him by his words. I think that the first thing that he can do, in his inauguration address, is to signal the changes that he will make in the way that he runs central Government, appoints governors, and deals with the problems with corruption—especially corruption relating to heroin and drugs. It is for President Karzai to show the international community that his Government can have credibility because of the actions that he is prepared to take.

Nicholas Clegg: I am grateful for those words, but the Prime Minister needs to be more precise. May I ask him again— [Interruption.] He needs to acknowledge first that our mission in Afghanistan is in trouble because we do not have a legitimate Government in Kabul, and we do not have a coherent international plan for Afghanistan. So I ask him again what exactly he will do if the legitimate and inclusive Government whom we so desperately need in Kabul do not emerge?

Gordon Brown: I have said before that as we train Afghan security forces to get them to take over the task and the responsibilities of Afghanistan—I am saying what President Obama and the other leaders have said—we will be able gradually to bring our forces home. The measure of success in Afghanistan will be that British forces can come home because Afghan forces are able to deal with the security problems of the country themselves. That is what our strategy is about—to build up the Afghan army and security forces, to build up economic prosperity for the Afghan people, and to make sure that the structures of local as well as national Government reflect the will of the people.

Andrew Turner: Island prisoners must be guarded when they need health care outside prison. By the end of this year, the local health budget will have been exceeded by more than £1 million. That could pay for an extra 15 nurses. Will the Prime Minister ensure that this inequity is corrected urgently?

Gordon Brown: I hesitate to use the words "iron-cast guarantee", but we have provided— [ Interruption. ] The words have become so devalued over the past few days. People will not forget that on Monday the Leader of the Opposition also made an iron-cast guarantee to the national health service; people will remember that as well. On nursery education, we are determined to ensure that three and four-year-olds have the best nursery education possible. We have increased the number of hours for nursery school, and we will continue to make sure that Sure Start provision is available in every constituency.

Mr. Speaker: Before I call the Leader of the House, I have an announcement to make about the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority.
	Under the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, it falls to me as Speaker to select a candidate for the chair of IPSA. The Act stipulates that the candidate must be recruited on merit on the basis of fair and open competition, and that the choice must be agreed by the Speaker's Committee for the Independent Parliament Standards Authority established under the Act.
	Following an open competition carried out by an independent panel, I can today inform the House that I have selected, and the Committee has approved, Professor Sir Ian Kennedy as chair-designate of IPSA. His appointment must be confirmed by the House of Commons before he is formally appointed by the Queen. He will be paid a maximum of £100,000 a year.  [Interruption.] Order. We are fortunate— [Interruption.] Order. We are fortunate to have such an eminent candidate for this important post. Sir Ian was chairman of the Healthcare Commission from its creation until 2009, and he is well known as the chairman of the public inquiry into paediatric cardiac surgery at Bristol Royal infirmary. He originally qualified as a lawyer, and he has a long and distinguished record of chairing and being a member of public bodies.
	IPSA is charged with establishing a new and wholly independent system governing MPs' allowances that can command the confidence of the public and of this House, and I am confident that Sir Ian will bring significant leadership skills to that task.

Harriet Harman: With permission, Mr. Speaker, I would like to make a statement.
	Today the Committee on Standards in Public Life, under its chair Sir Christopher Kelly, has published its report setting out recommendations for a new framework for parliamentary allowances. People in this country need to be able to have full trust and confidence in their Parliament. What happened under the old allowance system has knocked that confidence.
	We come into Parliament not to serve our own self-interest but to serve the public interest, but that is not the impression that the public have. We have all acknowledged that and have recognised that to ensure that we have a system in which everyone can have confidence, we need to take action. We have already made changes and the Kelly report is another important step on that path to restoring public confidence.
	Before I turn to the Kelly report, I would like to remind the House of the action that we have already taken. To deal with the past, we are ensuring that any overpayments, including those which were simply a mistake, are paid back. That is the work that the Members Estimate Committee, which is chaired by you, Mr. Speaker, commissioned from Sir Thomas Legg. We have already taken action to change the current allowance system. In order to allow for the period while wholesale reform of our allowances is being considered, we introduced interim measures last May to pare back allowances as a result of a meeting of the party leaders and the Members Estimate Committee.
	Amid the enormous attention paid to past problems, no one should overlook the fact that we have already decided to cap the monthly amount that can be claimed on mortgage or rent; to prevent a Member from changing the designation of their main or second home; to abolish the second home allowance for outer-London Members; and to stop claims for furniture, stop claims for cleaning and stop claims for gardening. Parliament has not sat back waiting for Kelly. The current allowance system is already very different from the one which allowed for the claims that have angered both the public and the House.
	We have also recognised that for the future, it is no longer appropriate for us to set or administer our own allowance system. That is why in July we passed the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, which sets up the new Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, which will decide on our allowances and run the system, so just as we no longer vote on our own pay increases, we will not play a part in deciding or administering our allowances.
	My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in March asked Sir Christopher Kelly, the chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, to review the system of MPs allowances. I would like to thank Sir Christopher and his committee for the important work they have undertaken, and also to thank all those, including many hon. Members, who gave evidence to his committee. His report was published only this morning, but it is obviously right for the House to hear an early statement and to have the chance to air initial views.
	MPs representing constituencies outside London need to be able to live in both their constituency and in Westminster because they need to work in both places. We do not want a Parliament where the only people who can come to Westminster as MPs are those who are wealthy enough to afford to pay for second homes out of their own pocket. Nor do we want to undermine the importance of MPs working in two places—the constituency and Westminster. Both are important. Nor do we want to have a situation where you cannot have your family with you if you are an MP. The Kelly report recognises that the allowances are there so that Parliament works properly on behalf of people in this country; the constituency link is sustained; Parliament is not barred to people on modest incomes; and so that Parliament is not barred to people with a young family. The Kelly report acknowledges this.
	The Kelly report covers 138 pages and puts forward 60 recommendations. Among the key recommendations are two that I would like to draw to the attention of the House. First, on the recommendation that Members should not be able to claim for mortgage interest but only for rent or hotels, the committee recommends that those with existing mortgages should be able to continue to claim for one further Parliament. It recommends that Members should not be reimbursed for the employment of family members. Those who currently employ family members will be able to continue to do so for one further Parliament.
	Turning to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, the acting chief executive, Andrew MacDonald, has been appointed and has begun work, and you, Mr. Speaker, have just announced that Professor Sir Ian Kennedy has been selected as the new chair-designate of IPSA. I will put the motion to confirm his appointment to the House in the next few days. The other members of the authority will be appointed shortly.
	The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority has already started the work of setting up the new allowance regime for MPs. A new allowance regime will be in place to come into effect in the new Parliament, as recommended by Sir Christopher Kelly. In the light of this, the Government welcome and fully accept the Kelly report, which should be taken as a whole. It will be for IPSA to take it forward. This is the approach Kelly's report itself recommends.
	Until such time as IPSA takes the Kelly report forward, we will retain the current restricted allowance rules and every claim will of course be published and available for the public to see. Because we decided in July that in future we would play no part in deciding our allowance system and that it would be done independently, it does not make sense for us now to vote on the future shape of our allowance system. Instead that is the job of IPSA. After all, that is what we set it up to do. The Parliamentary Standards Act lays down that IPSA must consult MPs and others when drawing up the allowances regime. IPSA will set to work immediately and we expect, following such consultations, it to proceed as quickly as possible to put into effect the Kelly recommendations on allowances.
	The events that lie behind the recommendations in the Kelly report have caused anger and dismay both in the public and among hon. Members. Our responsibility is to continue to take the action needed to sort the situation out and to make the changes that are necessary. The payback system is under way. The new restrictive allowance system will remain in place. Sir Christopher Kelly has recommended a new framework for our allowances, and IPSA is up and running and will set up the new allowance system and administer it. Sir Christopher Kelly's report is another important step on the road to the public knowing that the allowance system has been put on to a proper independent footing and that we are getting on with our important task of serving our constituents and this country.
	This House of Commons has yet to fully resolve this damaging episode. But with clear acknowledgement of the public anger, with the firm action already taken, with the Kelly report and the establishment of the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, this will be resolved. I commend this statement to the House.

George Young: I thank the Leader of the House for her statement and may I take this opportunity to deplore the way in which Sir Christopher's report was selectively leaked last week?
	This report was commissioned because neither the House nor the Senior Salaries Review Body was able to come up with a sustainable solution to the vexed question of our allowances. On behalf of my party, I wish to thank Sir Christopher and his colleagues for producing a thorough report, whose conclusions we shall accept in full and take forward.
	My brief questions fall into two parts—first on the process for implementing reform and, secondly, on the substance of some of the recommendations. On process, does the Leader of the House agree that now that the report has been published, our priority should be to ensure that these reforms are implemented as quickly as possible? Is not the position now very different to that when Sir Christopher began his review? Then he was going to produce the definitive response on which we would vote, and possibly resolve this by Christmas. But since June, as the Leader of the House said, the Parliamentary Standards Act has been put on the statute book, giving IPSA and not Kelly the final say on our allowances. So today's report is not the end of the process—that rests with IPSA, which is not yet constituted. Does she agree that it is important, therefore, that the consultation on Sir Christopher's report and the consultation that IPSA is obliged to carry out should happen at the same time? Does that not mean that IPSA should be up and running as soon as possible, taking Kelly as its text, and if we move quickly, might IPSA come to its conclusions on the Kelly report by February? Under that scenario, can she confirm that the interim arrangements might run until the new IPSA regime kicks in, possibly at the beginning of the next Parliament? Related to that, does she recognise that the continued uncertainty of the timetable for establishing IPSA is causing anxiety for many staff at the Department of Resources, who have to keep the show on the road without knowing their future? Finally, on process, does the Leader of the House recognise that some of the recommendations will require primary legislation, and when does she plan to introduce that?
	Turning to the substance of the recommendations, I declare an interest in the employment of relatives. I believe that there is insufficient appreciation of the demanding jobs that all staff do, often at antisocial hours, and many colleagues on both sides of the House, and indeed their constituents, will attest to the invaluable service that family members can, and do, provide, as was confirmed by Sir Christopher this morning. However, does the right hon. and learned Lady accept, as I do, that in a modern Parliament the current arrangements no longer carry public confidence? Does she agree that we need to accept Sir Christopher's recommendations while considering closely his proposed transitional period to ensure that the House does not fall foul of employment law?
	On communications, we welcome Sir Christopher's endorsement of our proposals to scrap the communications allowance, and I welcome what he said on MPs who retain outside interests. I also welcome the recommendation to enable IPSA to look at pay, pensions and allowances, enabling the full spectrum of MPs' remuneration to be considered in the round. Does the right hon. and learned Lady agree that it was the fragmented approach of the past that is partly to blame for the mess that we are in today?
	On accommodation, again we support Sir Christopher's recommendations. The public have lost confidence in the current regime, and it has to change. As Sir Christopher says, IPSA will need to look closely at the proposals in the report. There are legitimate concerns with aspects of it, particularly the rules surrounding those who are expected to get back to their constituencies at night. Does the right hon. and learned Lady accept that Sir Christopher's proposals on rent will need to be monitored by IPSA to ensure that the overall package is not more expensive than it is now? Does his package meet the Prime Minister's test on reducing the cost to the taxpayer?
	Finally, the issue before us has dogged the House for the past 12 months. The public are waiting for action. Sir Christopher provides the basis for an enduring settlement that is fair to the taxpayer and Members of the House—existing and potential—who need the resources to do the job properly without relying on private means. Is it not now paramount that we make urgent progress in what remains of this Parliament, so that we can return to our core tasks of scrutinising legislation, holding the Government to account and fighting for our constituents, and so that we can bequeath to our successors in the next Parliament the opportunity of a fresh start?

David Heath: Sir Christopher Kelly deserves our congratulations and thanks. The report is comprehensive and thorough. There will of course be issues of detailed implementation, but does the Leader of the House agree that we would not expect IPSA to disregard any part of what Sir Christopher calls
	"a package, not...a menu of options"?
	Should not those colleagues who have expressed difficulties with some parts of the report recognise that we have a unique and privileged position—a position that we apply for every four or five years? The terms of that contract have changed. Those who do not like it have a choice as to whether they reapply.
	The Leader of the House has rightly pointed out what has been done recently. It is only fair also to set out the criticism in Sir Christopher's report of what he describes as
	"a series of piecemeal attempts at reform, some of which were announced while we were deliberating. These attempts have, at best, lacked coherence."
	We have made some progress, but we should recognise that criticism.
	Some of the recommendations cannot be implemented without changes in either Standing Orders or primary legislation. Despite what the Leader of the House said in response to the right hon. Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir George Young), can she assure me that those will be considered as a matter of urgency?
	It is clear that IPSA will deal with the detailed arrangements. Nobody doubts that, but may I renew the call for an opportunity for all right hon. and hon. Members—not just the lucky few who catch your eye this afternoon, Mr. Speaker—not to vote or amend the recommendations, but to debate them? When I called for such a debate last week, the Leader of the House said that
	"the hon. Gentleman should make up his mind: does he really think it right that this House should pick over the question of our allowances when we have already decided to make that the responsibility of an independent authority? He cannot be on both sides of the argument".—[ Official Report, 29 October 2009; Vol. 498, c. 446.]
	I am clear: Sir Christopher Kelly's proposals should be implemented in full without equivocation. In the light of her widely reported comments over the weekend, can she say the same, or is she trying, for whatever reason, to be on both sides?
	After a disastrous and shaming year for Parliament, Sir Christopher Kelly has taken us back to where we should have been in the beginning when he says:
	"Members of Parliament have the right to be reimbursed for unavoidable costs where they are incurred wholly, exclusively, and necessarily in the performance of their parliamentary duties, but not otherwise."
	Is that not precisely correct?

Harriet Harman: I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the report should be seen as a package, not a menu of options, as Sir Christopher Kelly recommends. I also agree that Sir Christopher Kelly himself acknowledges the progress that the House has already made to improve the system, but nonetheless says that taking a piecemeal approach has meant that this progress has lacked coherence. That is why it is important that the Christopher Kelly proposals go to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority as a whole, rather than being dealt with piecemeal.
	Obviously the further issues that Sir Christopher Kelly deals with—for example, the structure of the Standards and Privileges Committee and various structural issues to do with IPSA, which are not to do with the allowances regime package, which needs to be dealt with as a whole—are ones that we will need to consider.
	On allowances, we should all be on the side of ensuring that the House can do its job. It will help the House to be able to do its job when Sir Christopher Kelly's proposals go to IPSA. It is not a question of our returning to the work that we need to do; the truth is that we have never stopped scrutinising legislation, holding the Government to account and doing the work of the House. We need to return to a situation in which the public have confidence that that is the case.

Peter Robinson: First, may I welcome the publication of Sir Christopher's report and the statement by the Leader of the House? I very much approve of the approach that she is taking to this matter. If any parliamentary procedures are required to implement what she laid out in her statement, she can be assured that my colleagues will be happy to support her.
	As the fundamental systemic problem has arisen from the fact that Members of Parliament have been setting both their pay and conditions, and the standards of their expenses and allowances, it would be entirely wrong for Members of Parliament to attempt in any way to unpick Sir Christopher's report. In that context, will the Leader of the House ensure that there will be Government support for all of Sir Christopher's recommendations?
	There was one issue on which Sir Christopher did not feel it appropriate to make a comment—namely the pay, expenses and allowances of Members who do not take their seats in this House. In the new circumstances, will the Leader of the House ensure that the House has the opportunity to vote on that issue?

Harriet Harman: No, I do not think that we should have a "take note" debate. It might be possible in the future to keep under consideration whether there should be a further debate, but I do not think that we want to get into a situation where we have a vote on the different aspects of Kelly. We have had an opportunity for Members to try to catch the Speaker's eye today. If there is a need for further discussions about this, we will have to consider that. The fact of the matter is that we are trying to move away from the House's preoccupation with our own allowances. Many hon. Members—more than 80, I think; myself included—gave evidence to the Kelly inquiry, and he drew up his recommendations and report with that in mind. The matter will now go to IPSA, which, under the Act, has the responsibility to consult Members of this House as well as others.
	It has been the habit of a lifetime for us to spend a lot of time in the House debating our pay. We have now broken ourselves of that habit, and it was important that we did so. It has also been the habit of a lifetime for us to discuss our allowances, but we know that, every time we do that, we adopt a piecemeal approach and it causes dismay among our constituents, who, as my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough (Sir Stuart Bell) said, are asking why we are not discussing their jobs and their prospects. We have now set this independent system up, and that is how the matter is to be taken forward. I do not rule out the prospect of a debate in the future, but I hope that—in so far as it is in my power to do so—I may rule out the idea that the House will take Kelly and have a series of votes on all the different bits of it. That would be very undesirable.

Angus Robertson: I very much welcome the Kelly recommendations—moving Westminster, as they do, towards the higher standard now operating in the Scottish Parliament. At the all-party talks on these issues, much hope was invested by everyone in all the parties that IPSA would deal with pay, allowances and expenses, so it must surely be for IPSA to take the Kelly report forward, and not for MPs to cherry-pick what they like from what they do not like.

Harriet Harman: Indeed. When we set up IPSA, and when we were discussing the Parliamentary Standards Act, our imperative was expeditiously to set up an authority with the specific remit of dealing with parliamentary allowances. The Justice Secretary, who took the legislation through the House of Commons, acknowledged at the time that, once IPSA was up and running, it might be able to take on a further remit—for example, that of pay. We are already safeguarded to some extent on pay, however, in that we have already decided not to vote on it. That matter could become statutorily embodied in IPSA in the future, but the most important thing is that the whole Kelly package on allowances falls to be considered by the authority and implemented for the next Parliament.

Harriet Harman: I do not think that it is unusual, when changing from an old system to a new one, to have transitional arrangements, when hon. Members—or anyone else—have already entered into arrangements. The transitional arrangements should therefore apply. There is nothing unusual about that, and I think that people will understand it.

Harriet Harman: The avoidance of capital gains tax is a matter for the Revenue and Customs; it is its responsibility. As for the designation between main and second homes, that has already been addressed at the meeting, chaired by the Speaker, that was attended by all the party leaders, the Members Estimate Committee and the Chair of the Committee on Members' Allowances. At that meeting, it was agreed—and subsequently taken through by the Members Estimate Committee and put into effect—that there was to be no change in designation between a main and second home. Since May, there has been no possibility of that change being made. Even before then, if a proper, accurate description was not given to the Revenue about a second home, that would be a matter for the Revenue to look into so that it could deal with the tax issues.

Harriet Harman: I will listen to, and reflect on, what hon. Members say about wanting a debate, but we all need to ask what the purpose of such a debate would be. We have all agreed that, if it was a "take note" debate, there would be no vote on it. Would its purpose be for hon. Members to make comments in the Chamber to IPSA, to enable it to understand hon. Members' position in the way that they want? If that is the purpose, that can be done either on the Floor of the House in a debate or by writing to IPSA. Bearing in mind the point we are at now, we must reflect quite carefully: we have had the Kelly report and IPSA is going to do its work. We should perhaps try to work according to an element of self-denying ordinance—as soon as I say it, I realise it might be beyond our ability—whereby having legislated for an independent authority, we actually allow it to get on with its work.

Helen Southworth: I beg to move,
	That leave be given to bring in a Bill to require simple, uniform nutritional labelling on the front of packaged foods; and for connected purposes.
	A very broad coalition of support for action is forming, following the extensive research commissioned by the Food Standards Agency and published earlier this year, which found that consumers were confused by the various different labelling formats on the front of packaging and wanted a single simplified system. The labelling approach found to be easiest for customers to understand is a combination of traffic light colours, high, medium, low text and percentage guideline daily amount—GDA—information. The FSA is now formally consulting stakeholders on its findings.
	A wide range of retailers have already acted in response to consumer demand for simple at-a-glance information to help busy people to choose to be healthy. The Co-op, Sainsbury's, Waitrose, Budgens and Londis, Booths and Boots are all using traffic light labelling on their products. The Co-op says:
	"The health and wellbeing of our customers is important to us, which is why we use traffic lights as a way to convey information and help customers to make choices about the food that they eat".
	ASDA and Marks & Spencer use a combination system. ASDA says:
	"An overwhelming majority of our shoppers have told us this is the style of labelling they want to see, so that's exactly what we're going to give them".
	Marks & Spencer said:
	"We aim to provide our customers with clear information—any details you might want or need to be able to make an informed choice about what you're eating".
	An increasing number of manufacturers are using traffic lights in response to customer demand for simple information. It is very clear from their public statements about labelling that they see a benefit in the marketplace from listening and responding to customers' requirements.
	The traffic light system came under fire from some sources when it was first being considered because of fears that it would mislead customers rather than allow them to distinguish between products, but as the system matures, many manufacturers are using clear, simple labelling to address the fat, sugar and salt content of their food, knowing that customers are finding it easy to make a choice based on quantifiable and easily comparable information.
	There is also a clear awareness that customers want to be able to control the contents of what they eat, and that giving them the information is essential to allow them to do that. If retailers want customers to buy their goods, they have to give customers what they want. McCain, for example, has redesigned its packaging to include both the FSA traffic light and the GDA, as recently recommended, saying:
	"Product reformation... means that most of our products are green and amber. McCain Rustic Oven chips have four green lights and have attracted younger users to the category."
	The company is working to ensure that its products meet customers' needs. Sainsbury's uses the multiple traffic lights as a tool for redevelopment of its products, with whole categories reformulated to reduce the number of red traffic lights on the front of packs—giving customers what customers want. Marks & Spencer are promoting its improvements to its recipes with banners across the shops, announcing on its website that
	"in the past two years we've removed over 400 tonnes of salt from our food."
	It is saying that because that is what its customers want.
	Yo Sushi, East Midlands Trains, National Express, Virgin Trains and Mysupermarket.co.uk are all using the FSA traffic light labelling system. The news might look good for customers, with such a wide range of suppliers responding to the need for a simple front-of-package labelling, but, unfortunately, we still have a long way to go before customers—busy people, shopping in a busy environment—can make quick decisions about what is best for them.
	The Which? "Hungry for change" healthier choices progress report 2009 comments that
	"the retailers and manufacturers who are already using the traffic light scheme have reported that it is having a positive impact, both in terms of enabling consumers to make more informed choices, but also by encouraging reformulation of recipes to produce more products with fewer reds, increasing the range of healthier food products on offer to consumers."
	It continues:
	"It is positive that a lot of products now carry nutrition information on front-of-pack as well as back-of-pack, and that many retailers and manufacturers are using the FSA's multiple traffic light labelling scheme. However, many are still not using the scheme, including two of the major retailers... and some of the main manufacturers despite research showing that it is the best approach. Until there is a consistent UK-wide scheme used across all products based on what works best, there will continue to be confusion".
	It is really crucial that we get this right.
	Experts reckon that about a quarter of all cancer deaths are caused by unhealthy diets and obesity. Strokes could drop by 13 per cent. if people reduced their daily salt intake by 3 grams. Heart disease is the UK's biggest killer, accounting for more than 200,000 deaths every year. Poor diets contribute significantly to the onset of heart disease, with diets that are high in fat, salt and sugar and low in fruit and vegetables accounting for 30 per cent. of all coronary heart disease deaths.
	The British Heart Foundation has a very good example that supports the necessity to provide dietary information at point of sale. It reports that the snacks most often found in vending machines in leisure centres have an average caloric content of 203; it would take a seven-year-old 88 minutes of swimming in the leisure centre pool to burn off that many calories. It has been estimated that 20,000 premature deaths each year could be avoided by reducing daily salt intake to 6 grams; 3,500 more by reduction of fat in foods; and a further 3,500 by reduction of sugar to the recommended guideline daily amounts. So it is not surprising that people want to be in control of what they eat.
	Over the summer, I carried out an extensive consultation with my constituents on the issue of front-of-package labelling and what they wanted to see. Overwhelmingly, people wanted simple at-a-glance information that was standard across all manufacturers so that they could choose easily between products—wherever and whatever they were buying.
	The FSA has identified the single simple system that is best understood by consumers and it has some really heavyweight backers. The British Medical Association says that
	"improved consistent labelling will help customers buy healthy food and will help them follow their doctor's advice".
	The British Heart Foundation supports the FSA's approach to front-of-package signpost labelling as it offers instant help to customers at the point of sale. The British Dietetic Association says that
	"it is important that one clear front-of-pack scheme is adopted so that manufacturers can enable consumers to make choices with confidence."
	Diabetes UK says that
	"it is vital that people with diabetes and those seeking to reduce the risk of developing the condition get information about foods to help make the right choices about what to eat. Providing information in different formats is likely to be a little better than giving no information at all, so it's really important that the food industry is consistent."
	The National Heart Forum says:
	"We know that consumers want a single authoritative nutritional labelling scheme they can rely on, whatever brand and wherever they shop".
	The Royal College of General Practitioners
	"strongly supports this easily understandable and usable tool to identify which foods constitute healthy choices".
	The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, the Royal College of Physicians, the UK Public Health Association, the National Consumer Council, Netmums, the National Federation of Women's Institutes, the Stroke Association and Which?, together with huge numbers of our constituents, want simple uniform nutritional labelling on the front of packaged foods.
	We in the House should do everything in our power to make it happen.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Ordered,
	That Helen Southworth, Shona McIsaac, Mrs. Janet Dean, Joan Walley, Mr. Ian Cawsey, Christine Russell, Mr. Mike Hall, Ms Sally Keeble, Charlotte Atkins, Mr. Kevin Barron, Ann Coffey and Derek Twigg present the Bill.
	Helen Southworth accordingly presented the Bill.
	 Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time  tomorrow  and to be printed (Bill 158).

[Relevant d ocuments:  Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, Session  2007-08, on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, HC 551-I and—II, and the  Government response, Cm 7690.  Tenth Report from the Public Administration Select Committee, Session 2007-08,  on Constitutional Renewal: Draft Bill and White Paper, HC 499, and the  Government response, Cm 7688.  The letter from the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to the  Secretary of State for Justice dated 26 October 2009. ]
	[2nd Allotted Day]
	 Further considered in Committee

Michael Wills: I beg to move amendment 90, page 16, line 28, leave out lines 28 to 30 and insert—
	'(2F) In subsection (2D) "rule" has the same meaning as it has in section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998.".'.

Michael Lord: I remind the Committee that with this we are considering the following: Government amendment 91.
	Government new clause 43— Time limit for human rights actions against Scottish Ministers etc.

Michael Wills: May I say what a pleasure it is be here, Sir Michael, and to speak to amendments 90 and 91 and new clause 43 in the name of my right hon. Friend the Justice Secretary?
	Clause 33 deals with human rights claims brought against Northern Ireland Ministers and Departments. Clause 34 deals with claims brought against Welsh Ministers. The original clauses 33 and 34 define the rules that could impose a stricter limit of less than a year by reference to section 7(9) of the Human Rights Act 1998. However, after further discussion with the devolved Administrations and further consideration of the issue, we now think that it would be better to adopt a different approach to the definition and to link the meaning of "rule" more directly to section 7(5). That will make it clear that the rules under which a case can be brought will be identical as between the two regimes, and there is a direct reference to the specific provision in the Human Rights Act that gives rise to the time limit.
	We have therefore tabled amendments 90 and 91 to clauses 33 and 34 to provide that "rule" should have the same meaning as is given to the same word in section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act, thereby providing a link with the rules, which, for the purpose of that section, also impose a stricter time limit, and ensuring that the relevant time limits under the Human Rights Act and the devolution settlements keep pace with each other.
	New clause 43 deals with human rights claims brought against Scottish Ministers. I will now explain why that did not form part of the Bill. As Members will be aware, the provision arises out of the consequences of the House of Lords judgment in the Somerville case, which were more pressing in Scotland as Scottish Ministers are responsible for prisons—unlike Ministers in other devolved Administrations. Unlike other jurisdictions in the UK, there is no time limit in judicial review proceedings to act as an alternative, shorter, time limit to the one year. The Somerville case prompted a large number of claims concerning the segregation of prisoners in Scotland, so it was important to achieve clarity on the matter as rapidly as possible.
	As part of the agreement reached, after full discussion, with the Scottish Executive, an order was approved by this Parliament before the recess under section 30(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 to provide the Scottish Parliament with the competence to amend the Scotland Act to insert a one-year time bar for claims against Scottish Ministers. That was subject to the same power to extend the time limit in the interests of fairness and to any rule that might impose a shorter time limit. It was agreed that once the Scottish Parliament had amended the Scotland Act, the provisions of that legislation would be remade in UK legislation and the previous position on legislative competence would be restored to provide for a consistent approach across the United Kingdom.
	When the order under section 30 of the Scotland Act was debated, there was cross-party agreement that that was a necessary measure. The views of the Calman commission were formally sought in advance, and it agreed with our approach. It should also be noted that the section 30(2) order, which was the first piece of the legislative solution, was passed unopposed in both the UK and Scottish Parliaments. Emergency legislation was passed in the Scottish Parliament, but it did not receive Royal Assent until 23 July, after the Bill had been introduced. It therefore was not possible to include provision for Scotland on the Bill's introduction.
	New clause 43 imports the provision made in the Act of the Scottish Parliament, which inserted a one-year time limit to convention-based claims brought against Scottish Ministers under the Scotland Act. It also extends that provision to such claims brought anywhere in the United Kingdom, ensuring that the protection afforded in all three clauses is United Kingdom-wide. As in the amended clauses 33 and 34, the time limit is subject to a power available to the courts to extend it on equitable grounds, and it is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in the proceedings in question. As in clauses 33 and 34, the Scottish amendment provides that that "rule" should have the same meaning as is given to the same word in section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act.
	The amendment dealing with claims against Scottish Ministers will, in line with the terms of the agreement made with Scottish Ministers, preserve the effect of the provisions of the Act of the Scottish Parliament, but repeal that Act and the provision that gave the Scottish Parliament the power to make it, thereby restoring the previous position on legislative competence and maintaining a consistent approach across the United Kingdom.
	The amendments are part of an important package of measures to bring actions against the devolved Administrations under the devolution Acts broadly in line with the time limit set out in the Human Rights Act. I hope therefore that the Committee will accept amendments 90 and 91 and new clause 43.

David Heath: The order passed in this House enabled the Scottish Parliament to pass amendments to the Scotland Act to introduce a bar of one year or less. Will the hon. Gentleman advise the Cttee on whether the Scottish Parliament has in fact legislated for a bar of one year, or for a bar of less than a year?

Michael Wills: Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that this is an immensely complex legal issue? Does he also recognise that both sides, the Scottish Government and Whitehall, have gone to great trouble to try to reach a consensus? These things are not always quick and easy, but we have moved with all due speed.
	May I remind the hon. Gentleman that all Executives are sometimes subject to delays? As I speak, we have still not received from the Scottish Government a crucial document—the legislative consent motion—which we have been expecting. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that delays on all sides are inevitable in this process?

Nigel Dodds: I welcome the Government's approach to the introduction of time limits for human rights action against Northern Ireland, Welsh and Scottish Ministers. I will not rehearse all the arguments, but I think that this is a sensible provision, and, as the Minister will know, it has been welcomed by the Northern Ireland Executive. Although the Somerville judgment did not deal with claims under the legislation governing the devolved arrangements in Northern Ireland—or, indeed, legislation relating to Wales—the problems that arose in Scotland could arise there.

Eleanor Laing: We also welcome these provisions. I welcome the provisions already in the Bill, and I was pleased to see that, albeit belatedly, the Government had tabled the new clause. I do not blame the Minister for the delay; I appreciate what he said about the complexity of the issue, and I agree that it is not surprising that it has taken some time to present measures to deal with it.
	I must tell the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) once again—I am making a habit of this, and I shall have to be careful about it—that he was absolutely right in all that he said. The potential cost to the taxpayer—and the actual cost so far—of the mistake that was made in allowing an anomaly to arise have been considerable, but let us hope that that flow of taxpayers' money will now be stemmed.
	I am still concerned about one thing, however. I do not know whether the Minister will be able to answer my question, and the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire may wish to intervene It appears that there is now a different time limit for the bringing of an action where there is potential delictual liability—or, indeed, an action in a personal injury case—to that for bringing an action under human rights legislation.
	The following situation could therefore arise under the terms of the Bill. Somebody who has been injured would have a right to bring a case under human rights legislation on which there would be a time limit of one year, but they would also have a right to bring a normal personal injury case or a case under the normal Scots law of delict—which is when someone has had an injury caused to them by someone else—and that would have a normal time limit of three years, or in some cases six or seven years. A person could therefore bring an action under the normal law of delict but by the time they discovered they were not going to succeed in that action it would be too late to bring an action under human rights legislation. The opposite situation could also arise: they might bring forward a human rights case and then discover that they had run out of time under the normal law of delict or personal injury law. I am taking a long time to explain this in order for the Minister to have a chance to consider the matter.

Eleanor Laing: I thank the Minister for that answer, which is perfectly in order, and I appreciate that that is as far as he can go in discussing this Bill and his responsibilities. I am merely putting down a marker that there could be a further anomaly here which somebody somewhere within the Scottish or UK Governments might wish to look at before an injustice occurs as a result of it—let me put it no more strongly than that. I am glad that the Minister has taken the point on board, and I am sure his colleagues will look into it. As the Minister has said, this matter is complex and addressing it has taken quite some time, and I do not blame him for that. Not for the first time, however, these mistakes and injustices have arisen because of the way in which devolution has been implemented and as a result of matters not having been properly thought through in advance.

Eleanor Laing: I thank the hon. Gentleman for agreeing with my point. Like me, he spends many hours in Delegated Legislation Committees correcting the anomalies of the devolution legislation, and I and many of my colleagues—and many of his colleagues, and also many of the Minister's colleagues—spent weeks and months in this Chamber raising these matters when we dealt with the Scotland Act. I am merely saying that we were right then and the Government were too complacent.

Michael Wills: I shall be brief, as I do not want to protract proceedings unduly. I am sure the whole House has noted that a curious alliance and amity is developing between the two parties that opposed devolution, and that did so for completely different reasons, in reliving those old arguments. Most of the people of the United Kingdom, including most of the people in Scotland, think devolution has been a great success. It is just worth the hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire reflecting on the fact that the House of Lords decided on Somerville by the narrowest of majorities—by three to two. Therefore, the suggestion that this was somehow inherent in the legislation is manifestly nonsense.

Eleanor Laing: The Minister shows great faith in his Government, but neither the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire nor I share it. The Minister is right that there is an alliance of sorts; it is an alliance of those who care about the Scottish legal system and the protection of Scots law and its principles. I have not said anything different from what I said when we discussed these matters and the Scotland Act was passed a decade ago; I have not changed my position at all. I have always argued that the United Kingdom can work perfectly well and properly with different legal systems, as it has done for centuries.
	I declare an interest: I am a Scots lawyer by profession. Because of that and the fact that I am also conversant in the practice of English law, I have always argued that it is perfectly possible to have a United Kingdom that functions properly for all its citizens throughout our entire country under different legal systems—indeed, as the Minister has said, under a devolved system, which we now have and which we all want to work properly. In order for it to work properly, however, it is incumbent on the Government to consider the pitfalls that might lie ahead and to consider possible anomalies that might arise, and to protect the legal system, the people, the principles of justice and, indeed, the taxpayer from the consequences of those anomalies.
	I appreciate that the Minister has today brought forward the right legislation to do that. I still agree with the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire that it is unfortunate that it has taken so long, but at least we have it today and we welcome it.
	 A mendment 90 agreed to.
	 Clause 33, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Amendment made: 91, page 17, line 12, leave out lines 12 to 14 and insert—
	'(3C) In subsection (3A) "rule" has the same meaning as it has in section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998.".'.— ( Mr. W ill s.)
	 Clause 34, as amended, order ed to stand part of the Bill.

'(1) In section 100 of the Scotland Act 1998 (c. 46) the following (as inserted by the Convention Rights Proceedings (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2009 (asp 11)) are omitted—
	(a) subsections (3A) to (3E);
	(b) in subsection (4), the words "Subject to subsection (3D),".
	(2) The Convention Rights Proceedings (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2009 (asp 11) is repealed.
	(3) Omit paragraph 4A of Schedule 4 to the Scotland Act 1998 (c. 46).
	(4) The Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 4) Order 2009 is revoked.
	(5) Subsections (1) to (4) above do not apply to any proceedings brought before this section comes into force.
	(6) After subsection (3) of section 100 of the Scotland Act 1998 (c. 46) insert—
	"(3A) Subsection (3B) applies to any proceedings brought by virtue of this Act against the Scottish Ministers or a member of the Scottish Executive in a court or tribunal on the ground that an act of the Scottish Ministers or a member of the Scottish Executive is incompatible with the Convention rights.
	(3B) Proceedings to which this subsection applies must be brought before the end of—
	(a) the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of took place, or
	(b) such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances,
	but that is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the procedure in question.
	(3C) Subsection (3B) does not apply to proceedings brought by the Lord Advocate, the Advocate General, the Attorney General, the Attorney General for Northern Ireland or the Advocate General for Northern Ireland.
	(3D) In subsections (3A) and (3B) "act" does not include the making of any legislation but it does include any other act or failure to act (including a failure to make legislation).
	(3E) In subsection (3B) "rule" has the same meaning as it has in section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998."
	(7) In subsection (4) of that section at the beginning insert "Subject to subsection (3D),".
	(8) Subsections (6) and (7) above apply to any proceedings brought after this section comes into force (including proceedings in respect of an act taking place before this section comes into force).'.— ( Mr. W ill s.)
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Michael Wills: rose—

David Heath: rose—

David Heath: Thank you for getting us out of a procedural conundrum in respect of exactly who should be speaking, Sir Michael. The point that I wish to raise on schedule 5—this may assist the Minister in collecting his thoughts—relates to the Government's response on the order-making power to exempt positions from the JAC's remit. In response to the Joint Committee's report, the Government said:
	"The Government remains convinced that the most appropriate way to resolve this issue is an order making power",
	but they went on to say that the Government
	"no longer believes this Bill is the appropriate vehicle for such a change, and in the meantime will explore further non-statutory options available."
	I would like to know precisely what that means. What are those "non-statutory options" that the Minister is exploring? When does he expect to bring forward more detailed proposals? What will they encompass?
	Schedule 5 removes magistrates from the JAC's remit by deleting them from schedule 14 to the 2005 Act. Presumably there is a good reason for that. The 2008 draft Bill also proposed an extremely broad order-making power allowing the Lord Chancellor to amend any part of schedule 14 to the 2005 Act to exempt candidates to certain offices from being selected by the JAC. I think that procedure was intended to allow redeployment, rather than appointment, and to facilitate matters within the field of judicial appointments. It would have been a sweeping power and, as such, it was not entirely surprising that it met with opposition from the JAC itself, the Lord Chief Justice, the House of Lords Constitution Committee and the Joint Committee. Although that proposal has now been dropped, we face the threat or promise of arriving at the same result by alternative means. We are entitled to know from the Minister exactly what those alternative means are and what the Government's intention is.

Michael Wills: As has been discussed, clause 35 gives effect to schedule 5, which makes amendments relating to judicial appointments and other matters. I hope that my brief run through what the schedule contains will help the Committee in deciding on this matter.
	What the Government have sought to do throughout their constitutional reform agenda is to recalibrate to ensure that we have the right relationships between the citizen, the Executive, the legislature—Parliament—and the judiciary. So, for example, the founding of a Supreme Court was a profound constitutional change, which symbolises and entrenches legally, the separation of powers between the state and the judiciary. However, there are also smaller steps that we must take to achieve the goals of this reform programme, and although they are smaller, they are not necessarily nugatory.
	Clause 35, and the provisions in schedule 5, to which it gives effect, both help to limit the role of the Executive and reinforce the independence of the judiciary. They also make a number of other minor changes to streamline the judicial appointments process. The Government remain committed to nearly all the proposals seen by the Joint Committee on the draft Constitutional Renewal Bill and we will continue to review and develop them separately from the forthcoming Bill, along with its judicial partners.

Michael Wills: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and if he will bear with me, I shall come to that point as I proceed through all the advantages of the schedule. Obviously, if he has written to the Lord Chancellor, I am sure that he will receive a full and completely adequate reply in a timely fashion.
	Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 9 of schedule 5 remove the Prime Minister from the appointment process of the president, deputy president and judges of the Supreme Court. Paragraph 2 amends section 26 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, with the effect that when presented with a candidate chosen by a selection commission recommendations for appointment will now be made by the Lord Chancellor instead of by the Prime Minister. Instead of notifying a selection to the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor is to make a recommendation for appointment. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 9 make various consequential amendments to the 2005 Act.
	Although we accept that the Executive need to retain a limited role in the appointment of the justices of the Supreme Court, so that there is a direct line of accountability to Parliament for such appointments, the Government believe that, as with all other judicial appointments, the Lord Chancellor has the necessary authority to fulfil this role. Involving the Prime Minister in addition to the Lord Chancellor at a point twice removed from the work done by the independent selection commission that is convened to recommend appointments to the Lord Chancellor in the first place only serves to perpetuate an erroneous perception that the appointment process is not as independent from the Executive as it should be. For that reason, the Government believe that even though the Prime Minister's role in recommending the final nomination to the Queen is a limited one, removing that role is very much in line with the Government's long-standing reform agenda of reducing the role of the Executive, where appropriate, wherever possible.
	Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the schedule transfer responsibility for obtaining medical assessments of selected candidates for judicial office from the Judicial Appointments Commission to the Lord Chancellor. That is supported by the commission because it sees the process of medical assessment as part of the final appointment process, rather than the initial selection process. In addition, there was consensus in consultation that this aspect of the appointment process should be quicker—and so there is general agreement with the burden of the appraisal made by the hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mr. Timpson), which is that it has taken too long.

Michael Wills: The hon. Gentleman is nodding. There is general agreement that this needs to be quicker, and the proposal helps to streamline the process by reinforcing an administrative move to a system of self-certification rather than a medical assessment by a doctor in every case—only in those cases where the self-certification reveals a cause for concern will candidates be asked to undergo a medical assessment. The proposal should speed up and streamline the process. No systems are perfect and obviously if further problems remain, we will address them. I hope that provides some reassurance to the hon. Gentleman.
	The Joint Committee was in favour of the proposal, but questioned whether it could be achieved without the need for legislation. The Government view is that legislation is needed to provide absolute clarity. Sections 96 and 97 of the 2005 Act provide for medical assessments of those who have been selected for appointments to be conducted by the Judicial Appointments Commission. Paragraph 5 of the schedule makes amendments to the provisions in section 96 of that Act relating to medical assessments. Sub-paragraph (3) adds new subsections (2A) and (2B) to section 96 to enable the Lord Chancellor to request a person who has been selected for appointment by the Judicial Appointments Commission to provide information about his or her physical or mental condition. The Lord Chancellor may specify a period in which the information has to be supplied.
	Sub-paragraph (4) amends section 96(3). The amendment made to that section provides that the Lord Chancellor may also request a candidate to undergo a medical assessment and for a report of that assessment to be made available to the Lord Chancellor. The provisions replace section 96(3) under which the Lord Chancellor may direct the Judicial Appointments Commission to make arrangements for any assessment of the health of those who have been selected for appointment.
	Sub-paragraph (5) modifies section 94(4) and sub-paragraph (6) inserts new subsections (4A) and (4B). These provide that the Lord Chancellor may, after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, notify the Judicial Appointments Commission that he or she is not proceeding with an appointment if the circumstances specified in new subsection (4A) apply. These circumstances are if the candidate does not comply with a request to provide information under the new subsection (2B) or to undergo a medical assessment under proposed new subsection (3)(a), or if the Lord Chancellor is not satisfied on the basis of a medical report under proposed new subsection (3)(b) that it would be appropriate to proceed with the appointment.
	Sub-paragraph (7) amends section 96(5) to make it clear that if a candidate is rejected, any other selection for the same appointment or recommendation is to be disregarded and that the candidate must not be selected again pursuant to that request for the same appointment or recommendation. Sub-paragraphs 8 and 9 are transitional provisions that ensure that the new procedures apply only to requests to undergo medical assessments made after the relevant provisions of the Bill have come into force.
	Paragraph 6 is a consequential amendment in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland. It ensures that where reference was made in section 97(1)(e) to the duty to consult the relevant head of judiciary under section 96(4)(a), the reference in section 97(1)(e) now refers to the duty to consult the relevant head of judiciary set out in section 96(4B).
	Paragraphs 7 and 10 provide for the removal of magistrates from schedule 14 to the 2005 Act. Schedule 14 to that Act lists the offices that comprise the statutory recruitment and selection remit of the Judicial Appointments Commission. Magistrates were included in schedule 14 under the title of justices of the peace as it was originally intended that recruiting and selecting for the role should be a part of the Judicial Appointments Commission's remit.
	The current system has the considerable advantage of providing invaluable local input into the process of recruiting and selecting local people to deliver local justice. Advisory committees are composed of local magistrates and at least one third of local lay persons. This helps to ensure that the recruitment and selection of magistrates is firmly grounded in the communities in which they serve. I hope that the whole House will agree that that is a desirable outcome. Agreement has been reached between the Lord Chancellor, the Judicial Appointments Commission, the Lord Chief Justice and the Magistrates' Association that the Judicial Appointments Commission will not in future take responsibility for the recruitment and selection of magistrates.
	Paragraph 10 of schedule 5 to the Bill removes magistrates from schedule 14 of the 2005 Act. The recruitment and selection function will therefore remain for the foreseeable future with local advisory committees, where it is performed effectively and with a high degree of independence by dedicated volunteers drawn from among magistrates and members of the local community.
	Paragraph 7 of schedule 5 amends section 118 of the 2005 Act to ensure that even though magistrates have been removed from schedule 14, they will remain within the scope of the disciplinary powers exercised by the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor. This could have been done by making an order under section 118, but in this instance the Government feel that primary legislation is the most efficient way to make the necessary changes. It most closely reflects the current arrangements, under which the disciplinary scheme applies to magistrates by means of primary legislation.
	Paragraph 8 of schedule 5 clarifies that confidential information obtained during the appointment or disciplinary process can be shared with the police for specified purposes relating to the prevention or investigation of crime, including for the purposes of criminal proceedings. Current sections of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 covering the disclosure of confidential information do not explicitly allow such information to be provided. We do not consider the proposal to be controversial: it is considered that any indication that a criminal offence had been committed could be disclosed to the police without the need for an explicit gateway, but without a legislative change the Ministry of Justice could be left open to the possibility of litigation that would be costly in terms of both time and money. We therefore want to make it completely clear that confidential information could be disclosed to the police.
	We are confident that sharing confidential information for the purpose of preventing a crime, or for the purposes of a criminal investigation or procedures, will be compatible with the principles of data protection. The Data Protection Act does not stand in the way of such disclosures, so they would either be compatible with data protection principles or fall under the exemption to the Act that relates to the prevention or detection of crime, or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.
	The proposal was raised in the White Paper, welcomed by the Joint Committee, and also supported by the JAC. It will bring the judicial appointments process into line with the process in other organisations.
	Paragraph 1 of schedule 5 corrects a typographical error. I was perhaps harsh with the hon. Members for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) and for Epping Forest (Mrs. Laing) for alleging that the Government had allowed an anomaly to creep into the devolution legislation. They were wrong about that, but I hold my hand up to the typographical error.
	The error came about because the original section 21(4) was substituted by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which also inserted section 21(4A). The amendments came into force on 3 April 2006, and this has been the first legislative opportunity to correct the error. The correction is uncontroversial and has no adverse impact, but I apologise to the Committee for the fact that it was allowed to creep in in the way that it did.
	I turn now to the question asked by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) about why we dropped certain provisions. We did not drop them: the way that I would phrase it—and I hope that he will agree that this is an accurate reflection of what happened—is that we listened. We consulted extensively on this Bill, and we listened carefully to what hon. Members, the Joint Committee and other people said.
	We took to heart what the Joint Committee said about making changes to a process that in effect has been in operation for only a short period. We remain committed to nearly all the proposals put to the Joint Committee, but we take the point that it might be sensible to allow the changes already in place to bed down before we decide exactly how to take them forward.
	We will continue to develop the entire judicial appointments process in partnership with our judicial partners separately from the Bill. We recognise that there is more work to do, and I think that the judiciary agree. We do not regard this as a closed chapter, but merely as an onward step in the process.

'(1) A person's salary determined under any of the following provisions may be increased, but not reduced, by further determinations.
	(2) The provisions are—
	(a) section 106(1) of the County Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 (c. 25 (N.I.));
	(b) section 12(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1964 (c. 21 (N.I.)) as it applies in relation to persons appointed under section 9(1) of that Act.
	(3) Subsection (5) applies if, in accordance with the terms of a person's appointment, the person is to be paid a salary (as opposed to fees) under any of the following provisions.
	(4) The provisions are—
	(a) section 2(1) of the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 (c. 15 (N.I.)) as it applies in relation to the remuneration of coroners (but not deputy coroners);
	(b) section 70 of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 (c. 23);
	(c) paragraph 2 of Schedule 4 to the Child Support Act 1991 (c. 48) as it applies in relation to persons appointed under section 23(1) of that Act;
	(d) paragraph 7 of Schedule 2 to the Social Security Administration (Northern Ireland) Act 1992 (c. 8) as it applies in relation to persons appointed under section 50(1) of that Act.
	(5) Under the provision in question the person's salary—
	(a) must be determined and paid accordingly;
	(b) may be increased, but not reduced, by further determinations.'.— (Mr. Wills.)
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

'(1) The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
	(2) Omit sections 76 to 84.'.— (Mr. Bellingham.)
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

The Second Deputy Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 22— Written tests by the Judicial Appointments Commission—
	'(1) Section 88 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
	(2) After subsection (5) insert—
	"(6) At no stage during any selection procedure may the Commission apply any written tests."'.

Henry Bellingham: I think that they are excellent appointments, but they could have taken place under the old system anyway without the need for this extremely costly bureaucracy.
	Section 64 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005—my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire spoke eloquently on it at the time—is headed, "Encouragement of diversity". It states:
	"The Commission, in performing its functions under this Part, must have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for appointments."
	It then says in subsection (2):
	"This section is subject to section 63",
	which stresses that the appointment
	"must be solely on merit."
	That is meaningless window-dressing and tokenism. We need to get coming into the professions, from an early stage, more people from ethnic minorities, more women, and more people who are enthused by the idea of a career in the law, either as solicitors or as barristers. We will do that by widening access to those professions. The chairman of the Bar Council feels incredibly strongly about that, as do I.
	The JAC is incredibly bureaucratic, and it is growing in size. I think that its annual running costs are £8.5 million; the Minister may well correct me, as he probably has the figures directly to hand. That may not seem a vast amount of money. However, we should look at it in the context of the changes that his Department is making to the legal aid budget, or the changes being made to the family law advocacy scheme, which has caused a huge amount of anger among barristers. The initiative to introduce best-value tendering for police station work will have a significant impact on several smaller firms. Yet the savings that will be made through those changes to the legal aid budget involve sums that are sub-£10 million. That is why the £8.5 million cost of the JAC, an organisation that is doing work that cost virtually nothing before, is significant.

Henry Bellingham: We have no plans to increase the amount of money for the legal aid budget. That budget is £2.1 billion, and we feel that far better value for money can be got from it. We feel strongly that we need to bear down on some of the drivers of costs, particularly the very high-cost cases, and that there is ample scope for bringing in new money to the legal aid budget from outside the MOJ. If the Minister is saying that he expects me to make a pledge to increase that expenditure, he knows the answer to that, unfortunately, as well as I do: whoever wins the next election, the Treasury will say that there will be no increase to that £2.1 billion. I hope that when the economy improves there will be more money for legal aid, because the legal aid budget is a vital part of the welfare state. Access to justice is something that all Conservative Members feel strongly about.

Henry Bellingham: If my hon. Friend asked me, "Is the JAC working?", I would say that it is not doing a bad job. However, we should put our hands on our hearts and think to ourselves that this is a time when this country's public finances are in an horrendously vulnerable state. The country will probably be spending about 10 per cent. of gross domestic product on the interest on our national debt. Bearing in mind that the figure in 1976, when the then Chancellor went off to the IMF, was 9.5 per cent., we are moving into Argentine or Guatemalan territory. That is why we must look at every single item of expenditure and ask ourselves, "Is this organisation doing a good job?" The answer is that it is not doing a bad job. If we ask, "Is it necessary? Was the previous system inadequate and not delivering?", the answer is that it certainly was delivering. That is why we must look at how much money it costs.
	Going back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mr. Timpson), one of the problems with the JAC is that because it is so bureaucratic, incredibly cumbersome, very costly and an empire that is growing the whole time, it is moving very slowly. I have heard similar stories to him about judicial appointments that are not being filled. The JAC is not conducting its affairs as efficiently as it should be. The competitions for different types of judicial appointment are not being run as speedily or efficiently as they should be. I have been round several combined courts over the past year or so, and I have had compelling stories put to me by presiding judges who are concerned about the speed at which these appointments are being made and the impact that that is having on their ability to conduct justice and to deliver the services that Ministers rightly expect presiding judges to deliver in their combined courts. The JAC must look into that.
	We realise that the JAC cannot be changed overnight, and if we win the next election we are not going to take an axe to it. However, we could certainly make some important initial changes and thereby reduce its cost and make it more efficient and streamlined. The Minister talked about these constitutional reforms having to be more streamlined. Well, we have a good idea in our new clause; let us see the Government support it.
	Why do we want to put new clause 20 on to the statute book? The answer is simple. Sections 76 to 84 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which relate to the appointment of Lord Justices of Appeal, are unbelievably cumbersome and bureaucratic. Section 78(1) states:
	"The Lord Chancellor may make a request to the Commission for a person to be selected for a recommendation for appointment as a Lord Justice of Appeal."
	Subsection (2) says that the Lord Chancellor
	"must consult the Lord Chief Justice";
	of course, he would have done that anyway. Section 79 states that
	"the Commission must appoint a selection panel"
	and says what the panel must do. It goes on to say that the
	"selection panel is a committee of the Commission".
	Section 80 states that the "first member" of the panel
	"is the Lord Chief Justice"—
	well, he would have been anyway—"or his nominee." Under section 81, the selection panel has to report and
	"state who has been selected".
	For goodness' sake, it would have done that anyway; it does not have to be specified in legislation. The report must
	"contain any other information required by the Lord Chancellor."
	Section 82 gives a number of options for the Lord Chancellor. That system is incredibly bureaucratic, ridiculously prescriptive, absurdly cumbersome, and very expensive. It requires a number of bureaucrats who are putting together a huge amount of paperwork, looking at that legislation and having to pinpoint each particular subsection.
	Let me return to the Minister's point about the appointment of Lord Justices of Appeal. I agree that they are excellent appointments, but they probably would have been made under the old system anyway. The key point is that all those appointments to the Court of Appeal came from the High Court. I may be wrong about that; if so perhaps the Minister will correct me. Any High Court judge or senior judge is, in any event, going to be someone who has gone through a major threshold in terms of his qualifying period in his career, and there will have been intense oversight and analysis of how he has done on the High Court bench. Of course, from time to time those High Court judges will make judgments that are taken to the Court of Appeal. So who better to analyse and assess the ability of those High Court judges as a possible Court of Appeal judge than the Court of Appeal judges who, time and again, are sitting in judgment, on appeal, on the judgments made by the High Court judges? We do not need a bureaucratic system of appointments under the JAC to appoint this particular type of judge. I put it to the Minister that for the sake of obsession with the new process and with constitutional reforms, a cumbersome operation is being put in place that is costing a great deal and is totally unnecessary.

Henry Bellingham: I thank my hon. Friend, who until his spectacular by-election victory was active in the courts day in, day out, as a family law barrister, appearing before judges at different levels of the judiciary and developing an in-depth understanding of what was going on. He is far better qualified than me, and probably than the Minister, to tell the Committee what is happening.
	I have a letter from a well known judge, who will, of course, remain nameless. After we had a discussion the other day, he wrote to me:
	"There is an arrogance about the JAC which refuses to recognise that the persons most able to judge are those before whom the applicant appears on a regular basis. Instead the task is assigned to persons who have no experience whatsoever of this work. No private company would tolerate such a procedure."
	He is right, because the people who are best able to assess the ability of applicants to the Court of Appeal are the judges before whom their decisions and judgments are assessed and appealed against. They know very well the ability of the applicants, and they are best placed to advise the Lord Chancellor. New clause 20 represents a small step, and as part of our reforms of the JAC, we will consider a number of ideas, but it is an important first step to remove judges in the Court of Appeal from the JAC's scope. I urge Ministers and other Members to support that modest proposal and thus reduce the costs of that body. We have ideas for the future, but this is a modest first step forward.
	New clause 22 is about written tests. I shall explain for hon. Members who may not know what they are that very often someone applying for a judicial appointment, particularly a more minor one such as that of recorder, district judge or county court judge, is asked to take a written test. Those tests are extremely unpopular and incredibly controversial, and they are very public.
	In the past, top QCs, leading solicitors and academics—and patent or trademark attorneys, whom we should not overlook because they can now qualify for judicial appointments—would make their application in confidence. It was kept confidential, because it might well have been turned down, and there is a certain amount of humiliation if a top QC or a managing partner of Allen & Overy applies for an appointment on the High Court bench and is turned down. In the past, no one ever knew that they had applied. Now, they have to take a written test in a public place, and everyone knows that they have done it.
	A large number of solicitors and leading QCs tell us that that is having an impact on their practice. They obviously want to keep their clients in place and keep their practice going, and they want to ensure that their partners in their firms and the junior members of their chambers have confidence in them as senior QCs or managing partners. Yet when they apply for a judicial appointment, which in the past would have been kept totally confidential, everyone hears that they have done a test. I am less concerned about whether they fail the test, because I am not saying that it is necessarily unfair, but it is completely unnecessary because it puts the fact of the application into the public domain.

Henry Bellingham: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point, because it leads me on to a briefing that I have received from the Law Society. I was staggered by what it said:
	"The written tests are proving to be an invaluable method of screening applicants. According to the JAC they are...a good indicator".
	Of course the JAC would say that. It continued:
	"Another beneficial result of the use of written tests is that more women, ethnic minority and solicitor candidates are progressing through to interview and eventual appointment."
	I put it to the Law Society and my hon. Friend that most top QCs and senior solicitors are used to dealing with complex paperwork day in, day out. Most of them have top degrees from top universities, and they have the self-confidence and ability to flourish in a written test. However, we are trying to encourage people to apply who are not as fortunate in their background but have ample ability and may well be ideal people to be considered for a judicial appointment, and they may well fall at that first hurdle. As he has said, that puts an unnecessary obstacle in the way of such candidates and may well put them off applying in the first place.
	I do not know whether the Minister has had a chance to look at the JAC's website or examine some of the tests, but some of them are Alice in Wonderland scenarios. We are asking senior people of his type of age, maturity and ability to take a written test in which they have to devise some imaginary legislative scenario and then work out cases based on it and deliberate upon them. They are not law students; they are top QCs, barristers and academics. The test is demeaning and completely unnecessary, and I have not yet met a single person who thinks it a good idea, apart from a few people on the JAC and the Law Society, which appears to regurgitate exactly what the JAC has said. If one speaks to any barrister or anyone who has been through the test, they say that it is completely unnecessary.
	Will the Minister tell the Committee what percentage of the £8.5 million a year costs of the JAC go into the running the tests? It must be expensive to devise the papers, put together the panels that write them, bring in outside consultants and expertise, book the halls where the tests take place, supervise the tests and put in place the necessary security. It is an incredibly expensive and bureaucratic exercise. The Minister talks about streamlining the system and making it simpler and easier. We have an idea for him: get rid of those tests, which are completely unnecessary.
	It seems to me that the JAC has found itself in new, uncharted territory, and of course any new organisation or commission will want to build an empire. The JAC is building its own little empire and wants to embed it, and what better way than to put in place something as bureaucratic as the written test procedure, which obviously means more work for people and more jobs?
	As I said to the Minister a moment ago, his budget is under huge pressure. Looking at the Red Book and the roll-forward of the Ministry of Justice budget, we see that he will be looking for cuts across the piece. There will be substantial cost cuts in prisons, in the Courts Service, maybe in legal aid, in the administration of the Legal Services Commission and in every other part of the MOJ because of what the Treasury has done to his Budget. Well, we are giving him a very good suggestion for reducing costs. At the same time, we are proposing the measures not just to reduce costs, but because we want a better system for judicial appointments. On that basis, I hope new clauses 20 and 22 will command the support not only of Opposition Members, but of the Minister and Labour Members.

Oliver Heald: May I start by talking about the quality of judiciary that we want to attract in this country? We have an honourable tradition and a high standard, which has been set by giants such as Lord Devlin, Lord Denning and Lord Reid. There is a history of legal figures who have commanded respect not only for their wisdom, but for their great intellect, their ability to interpret the law, and through the common law, their ability to make the law.
	That proud tradition brings me to the point the Minister made when he intervened on my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham). He asked my hon. Friend whether he could criticise any of the 12 appointments to the Court of Appeal. I would turn the question round to the Minister and ask him, "Look, you are spending £8.5 million extra; can you criticise any of those who went before?" I think the history of our appointment of judges, particularly at that level, is a marvellous one. I do not think that anyone could point to a Court of Appeal judge in England who was not of a high quality of intellect and wisdom. Some perhaps occasionally made judicial mistakes that were overturned in the highest court, but I do not think it could be said that they had no reasons for their decisions or for putting their decisions in the way they did.
	The problem of how to choose our judges for the higher courts all comes down to having a system that allows the best minds and the most wise to emerge. That is what happens. In the High Court, or dealing with tier 1 work in the Crown court, it becomes clear over a period which judges are doing an impeccable job. That happens not only by word of mouth, but because of decisions that go to appeal. Often when appeals are upheld, the judgment of a particular judge—his summing-up in a criminal case or his judgment in a High Court case—will be praised, and it will become the law in due course as the higher courts adopt his reasoning. Those legal minds and those people have emerged in the past and continue to emerge.
	Not only the lords justices of appeal sit in the Court of Appeal and the divisional court, but High Court judges sit there as flankers, helping the court as part of the court. Therefore, the lords justices of appeal get to see the High Court judges. They not only see their decisions, but see them in action. The High Court judges give judgments in cases and are often very highly regarded, particularly in specialist areas, so the idea that we need to have laymen in the JAC deciding who should be in the Court of Appeal is really a nonsense. The fact is that the people who should be there emerge through their talents, wisdom and intellect. That has always been the case, and we cannot point to a time when that did not happen.
	Why have we got the JAC? The commission has a worthy role—I am not against the idea that we should try to improve diversity—but I think merit should be the first and foremost criterion. In relation to the debate that my hon. Friend mentioned, my point was that it is all very well to have a two-track approach, but when it comes down to it, merit must be the greatest thing, because that will guarantee the rule of law and a system that holds water.
	Historically, it is true that the reason why we have a JAC is that Tony Blair, in the course of a reshuffle, decided he was going to abolish the Lord Chancellor. He wanted to do that not for any high and worthy reason—as far as one can tell—but because he had had enough of Lord Irvine. Lord Irvine says so, and I am sure that is the history. I thought it sad that our Prime Minister made a decision for that reason without even consulting the top judge in the country, Lord Woolf, who was told five minutes before the press release went out. It is said that his remark was, "What?" but that may be completely untrue.
	However, it is certainly the case that the concordat, which is a very substantial document, had to be agreed between the Government and the Lord Chief Justice before the new approach—retaining a Lord Chancellor but without many of the powers of before—was able to go ahead. At that time, various things were done to replicate the traditional role of the Lord Chancellor, such as his role in appointing judges. One thing that came out of that was the JAC.
	The Conservatives did not oppose the setting up of the JAC, but we made two important points on the matter. First, we said that merit should be the main reason for appointing a person, and secondly, we said that the higher courts should be treated slightly differently.
	If we look at what has been happening, we will see some encouraging signs in the law. When I first qualified as a lawyer, I think about 25 per cent. of solicitors were women; now the numbers coming through university law courses are roughly equal, so we can see improvement on that. There are greater numbers of ethnic minority solicitors and barristers coming through. The trend of ethnic minority solicitors setting up practices that cater to particular communities and their needs has been beneficial and we have seen some role models come through. It has enabled some pioneers to set the way.
	With that in mind, and on the subject of diversity and the role of the JAC, Lord Carter's suggestion—it is now being implemented—of making solicitors' firms larger so that they are more substantial entities that can undertake particular legal aid work, is not very helpful. The ethnic minority senior partners whom I have met have criticised that. They make the point that it creates something of a glass ceiling. If senior partners in small firms that cater to a particular community have to amalgamate with a larger firm, they will no longer be senior partners. Not allowing a member of an ethnic minority community member to be the senior partner in a small firm creates the glass ceiling, which worries me.
	The other point that is worth mentioning is that, as my hon. Friend said, the Bar Council has a very honourable tradition of trying to widen access to the profession. Geoffrey Vos, whom my hon. Friend mentioned, made that the keynote of his year's chairmanship. Through that period, he worked with a lot of schools and other institutions to encourage people from poorer backgrounds to come into the law and encourage barristers' chambers to offer proper scholarships, so that individuals had the money to train or undertake a pupillage. When I started—I went from a state education to the Bar—we had to find money from anywhere to survive during pupillage. I worked in an inner-city settlement in south London. In fact, I got to know the hon. Member for Eltham (Clive Efford) at that time—we used to run a youth football team together. However, it was not easy to become a barrister in those days. What Geoffrey Vos and others have done has been a good thing for the legal world.
	New clause 20 has a lot of merit, but I have mixed feelings about whether the written tests are a good idea. When they were first suggested, I worried that they would be about being a contemporary, modern kind of judge. We all know the story of the judge who famously asked, "Who are the Beatles?" during a case years ago, and there was the famous case in which a judge made an ill-judged remark about a soap star. I worried that the tests would be very politically correct, but my understanding is that they have not been about knowing who is in "The X-Factor" or who Simon Cowell is, or who Dannii Minogue is sitting next to—

Oliver Heald: The hon. Gentleman obviously has all the necessary trappings to become a judge, as he is asking who Dannii Minogue is— [ Interruption. ] Perhaps he prefers another member of the panel or perhaps he does not know what the panel is.
	It is a good idea, in some ways, to ensure that candidates have an appropriate level of knowledge. My hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk said that the top barrister or solicitor who wants to be a judge will be bound to know the basic information about how the legislature works and how to apply cases, but if we are trying to widen the ambit for the lower judicial appointments, it may be that having a written test that anyone can take will bring in a few more people. Does the Minister think that it is worth the cost of what is potentially quite a bureaucratic exercise? Historically, one would have said that the sort of people who would be able to apply to become a judge—after years of experience in the law—would not need to do a written test. What is the aim of the test? Is it about modernity, or some basic level of knowledge? Is it about encouraging new applicants but ensuring that they can read and write?
	In summary, I have great sympathy for new clause 20 and will be interested to hear the Minister's answers on new clause 22.

David Heath: I listened carefully to the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) and I heard much background history of the events that led to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, but I did not hear a convincing argument in favour of his new clauses. I will address the issues that he raised, but I am not yet convinced that I should advise my right hon. and hon. Friends to support his new clauses— [ Interruption. ] It is indeed sad that he was unable to persuade me, but perhaps I can demonstrate the holes in his argument.
	I start from the basis that the constitutional reforms to which the hon. Gentleman referred were, as he correctly said, a hurried and, in many ways, botched job. I was part of the Committee that dealt with those legislative changes and it was clear that, to a large extent, they had been written on the back of an envelope and were not subject to prior consultation. Indeed, they appeared as a complete surprise to most practitioners in the law, who quickly had to respond to what was being proposed and insist—properly—on certain conditions that were eventually part of the protocol that was decided with the Lord Chief Justice.

David Heath: I agree entirely, and it showed good co-operation between the two ends of Parliament and with the senior judiciary, who played an important role in achieving a good outcome from inauspicious beginnings. That is not to say that I object to the vast bulk of the proposals as they ended up, because I felt that they were right. They were changes that many of us had advocated for some time, but their genesis was more predicated—as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said—on the needs of political management than on the need for reform in good order.
	We now have these proposed changes to the proposals that were agreed then. I intervened on the hon. Gentleman to ask him why he felt that it was so important to remove the Judicial Appointments Commission process for the lords justices of appeal but to leave it in place for the other appointments, such as the Lord Chief Justice, the Heads of Division, the puisne judges and other office holders. I am not sure that I received a convincing answer. The argument was that the lords justices of appeal are senior judges, so the process was less appropriate. I would have thought that the Lord Chief Justice and Heads of Division were also fairly senior members of the judiciary, and if the argument held for one it would hold for the other. However, apparently that is not the case.
	The principal argument seemed to be that the process was bureaucratic, long and less than efficacious. I do not think there is any evidence that the latter is the case. There has been no serious objection to those who have been appointed lords justices of appeal since the process has been in place, nor has there been any criticism of their performance. So that is not a justified complaint.
	In terms of the length of the process, the hon. Gentleman made great play of what the Constitutional Reform Act says. It is a fact that when any sort of process is set out in statutory form, it necessarily sounds more complicated than it actually is. That is how the law works and how statutes look. In fact, it is a very simple process. The Lord Chancellor requests the JAC to fill a vacancy. The JAC appoints a selection panel, which submits a report to the Lord Chancellor about the person it has chosen, and the Lord Chancellor may reject the selection, require it to be reconsidered or accept it. Of course, once he has exhausted the other options, he must accept the JAC's decision. That is not a difficult process. It is the sort of process that any appointment procedure, other than the most archaic or rudimentary, would follow. It is a simple system of setting up a shortlisting process and then accepting the recommendation of the shortlisting committee in due course. I do not accept that it is an unnecessarily prolonged process.

David Heath: Obviously, a process, however simple, can be delayed in its execution. It might well be that those criticisms were entirely justified, and if so, I hope the JAC takes them into account and addresses the cause of the delay. I hope, too, that the Ministry of Justice is equally engaged in the process. However, I do not think that we can criticise a process for delay if the cause of the delay is not inherent in the process. That seems to be the crux of the argument. The hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mr. Timpson) might have a justifiable complaint—I do not have the information to agree or disagree with him—but I do not see that the cause of the delay is inherent in the process set out in statute. There should be no substantial delay other than that necessary to do a good job in appointments.

David Heath: In the case of the current Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice, the difference would probably not be very great. However, the hon. Gentleman knows his history, and he knows that the history of judicial appointments has not always been a good one. He knows that, in the past, some Lords Chancellor have blatantly abused their position in respect of judicial appointments. He might recall Lord Halsbury, who had a fearsome reputation for advancing the careers of those who shared his friendship or political persuasion. There are many other examples.
	The House should identify with—and it has done so in the process proposed in the Bill—a system that moves us away from the old-school club, from the magic circle and from decisions made between chums in fine dining rooms about who to put forward. That touches on one of my great criticisms of new clause 22: it does not propose an alternative process for the appointment of Court of Appeal judges; the suggestion is simply that they will "emerge"—I have heard that expression used several times in this debate. Well, we know what emerges from such a process: people who are male, who are educated in certain institutions, who share a commonality of background, but who do not necessarily represent those with the greatest merit for judicial appointments and who certainly do not represent the diversity that is beginning to develop, quite rightly, among the judicial, and indeed lawyer, populations in this country.
	The hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) makes an important point about how the situation has now developed—he applauded it, and I know he is genuine. However, he cannot then have a process that, at the end of the day, depends on who someone knows, rather than on a proper, transparent appointment process.

David Heath: But not enough of them. And look at the Supreme Court—there are not enough there! We cannot hold up the current population in the higher levels of the judiciary and say that it reflects modern Britain. However, it is not because of a paucity of candidates that we cannot address that situation, which is why I think it is important to have the judicial appointments system as it currently is.
	I agree with the Law Society, which rejects the proposal from the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk. It says:
	"The fear must be that there would be a reversion to the old system of secret soundings and appointment by the Lord Chancellor. That would be a wholly retrograde step."
	I, too, believe that it would be. I am surprised that the proposal has been put forward, not just because it is so partial—it would abolish the process for only one class of judicial appointment—but because of the effect that it would have in terms of reversion.
	On the written test, I am clear that there might be arguments on both sides. Criticisms have been voiced in legal circles about the tests, although some of them sound rather precious—as if there is some indignity involved in taking part in a proper appointments process. Senior appointments in other fields involving written tests, or something similar—presentations and so on—are made every day of the week. Nobody else sees it as an affront to their dignity to apply for a job and go through a proper selection process. Nobody else, whether a head of human resources or of a finance department, when they apply for a job as a chief executive, feels it an indignity to be known to be applying for a job and going through a selection process that might involve tests of some kind.

David Heath: There is an awful lot wrong with ministerial appointments, but let us not divert ourselves by discussing what is wrong with those. The hon. Gentleman might well be right—but there we are!
	In any case, the sort of person who will be put off by the process is the sort of person whom I am not sure I want as a judge, because it suggests that they have such high regard for their own dignity that they perhaps could not do the job as I, and many others—I think—would want them to do it. I note again the partiality of the new clause. In this case, it deals only with the selection procedure for puisne judges, and not other selections that the JAC makes. They alone would not have the written test.
	There is another point here, and it is the exact opposite of what the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said. He argued, I think, that the written tests will present an obstacle to diversity in the appointment of judges. That is the reverse, of course, of what the Law Society thinks. It says that they will be an assistance, and I think that they probably will be too. They will be an assistance to people who do not fit what has been—and I hope is no longer—the conventional view of what a judge ought to look like, because they provide an objective way for candidates to demonstrate that, whatever the preconceptions of those making the appointment, they have the technical ability, the level of judgment and the facility to perform in the way required of a judicial appointment. There is clear evidence that that process is helping well qualified, able and meritorious candidates to make progress in this area when otherwise they would not.
	But does that mean that the procedures cannot be improved? I am sure that if I had the ability, I could look at the written tests and see areas where they could be improved. Indeed, it would be remarkable if they could not be. However, I cannot see it as an affront to a well qualified barrister to ask them to go through a simple process before appointment or candidacy as a judge. I do not see engaging in such a process as below their self-esteem; indeed, for some candidates it is a benefit and helps to assess people who might otherwise not be considered as suitable for judicial appointment.
	On the basis of both those arguments, I am not persuaded by the case put forward by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk. I fear that he seeks to take us backwards, to an era when the magic circle did everything, when everything was decided by nudges and winks, and when what emerged was the same old type of person, who conformed in every way to the same old image of a judge. That is exactly what this House has been trying to avoid in the legislation that it has put in place over recent years.

Michael Wills: May I start by welcoming you to the Chair, Mrs. Anderson? You have assumed it since we began this debate, and although that might seem like a long time ago, I would still like to take this opportunity to welcome you to it.
	I congratulate the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) on his marathon tour of the horizon, as I think the translation goes. He ranged very widely indeed. I congratulate him in particular on his accomplishment of spending 30 minutes advocating what he described as a modest step. If I take it rightly, the reason he spent so much time on it is that he was treating the issue as a microcosm of what he and some of his colleagues who intervened on him see as wrong with the Government's constitutional reforms. He was right to treat the issue as a microcosm of different attitudes towards constitutional reform, because his approach, as seen in his colleagues' interventions on him too, reflects precisely the problems with the Conservatives' approach to constitutional reforms: a mistrust of the British people, a mistrust of change and a misunderstanding of the consequences of their own advocacy.
	The hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright), who has now wafted off somewhere— [ Interruption. ] No, he is still here, on the Front Bench. He said that he thought that the issue was a microcosm of how the Government did not know where we were going. He is wrong, because we know precisely where we are going in all the areas covered by new clauses 20 and 22. What lies at the heart of the arrangements that the new clauses seek to alter is the principle of the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary from the Government, which is fundamental.
	The hon. Gentleman may not recognise those principles; he may not think them important. But we recognise them and we think that they are fundamental to the health of our constitution. They are particularly important now, in what many commentators have described as a constitutional crisis. People have lost trust in the processes of their democracy, including those in this House, and in Members of this House. We know that, and every Member knows that we have to change that.
	One of the key things, as we take forward a programme of constitutional reform that all parts of the House recognise has to be undertaken, is that power should never be concentrated in one place. The best protection against the arbitrary or absolute use of power is the separation of powers—in other words, the diffusion of powers.

Michael Wills: With all respect for the hon. Gentleman, his understanding of our constitutional history is flawed. He is right that in this country we have always evolved, rather than had revolutions, although there have been great disjunctions in our political history—far more than we perhaps realise—and there has been a certain fuzzy logic about our arrangements. Nevertheless, there has always been a logic. Montesquieu, the great proponent of the separation of powers, took his inspiration from the way this country operated. I am proud to say that this country has always followed the principle that healthy societies are democracies in which power is diffused as widely as possible. All parts of the House can agree on that.
	That is fundamental, and it is precisely the area at which the measures that the proposed new clauses would overturn are directed—that is, the independence of the judiciary. It is profoundly important that we do nothing to harm that principle and that, as far as possible, we pursue the principle of the separation of powers. It is important not only that powers should be separated in practice, but crucially that they are perceived and believed to be so by the people we all serve.

Michael Wills: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, because I was about to come to precisely that point. I would just say that clichés are not really a maxim for constitutional reform, but I shall rephrase that, and say that we should not approach constitutional reform in this country as engineers with a blueprint into which everything has to be shoehorned. If that is what he is saying, I agree with him. He is nodding. We should approach it as physicians, healing what needs to be healed and encouraging preventive medicine. We need to be fit, and constantly to respond to the needs of the people we serve.
	The gist of the arguments in favour of the new clauses is that the system was good before, so let's not change it. I agree with the point made by the hon. Members for North-West Norfolk, for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) and for Rugby and Kenilworth that our judiciary has comprised many individuals of surpassing excellence. The hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire listed many luminaries of the bench, and we look back on their judgments and see their wisdom, their command of the law and the way in which they developed the common law. Of course, no one could possibly be anything other than full of admiration for the work that they have done over decades and generations. The hon. Gentleman is right about that. So, too, is the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) when he says that we should not be complacent about these things, however. Just because we have a list of luminaries, that does not mean that the system is perfect. Of course it is not, and we should always strive to do better. That is my response to the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth. The fact that the system was good does not mean that it cannot be better.
	I urge hon. Members to focus on this point: the system should not only work but be seen and believed to work in accordance with the fundamental principles of the British people. We have to give the British people confidence in the system. It is not enough that the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire thinks that those judges have been brilliant; the people we serve have to believe it as well.

Michael Wills: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman who, as always, brings a great deal of learning and knowledge to our proceedings. He is right. We have to be clear about the purpose of new clause 20: it is to return to the old system. Various points are made about the role of the Judicial Appointments Commission, but even in its own terms—and the terms of the argument made by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk—the provision is flawed. The hon. Gentleman quoted a letter from an anonymous judge, although I am not quite sure whether this was a High Court judge. The hon. Gentleman does not want to clarify that, so let us call him the anonymous judge of whatever level. He said that these appointments would be made by people with no experience of these matters, so let me remind the hon. Gentleman what happened before our reforms were put in place—the position to which he wants to return—and what happens now.
	Previously, these judges were appointed by the Queen—that remains—on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. According to our anonymous judge, the Prime Minister presumably has no experience relating to the people being appointed. The advice of the Lord Chancellor was also relevant, and he may well have had some experience before the reforms. The Lord Chancellor consulted the various heads of division; that was the role—they were consulted, and that was it. What happens now is that the Lord Chief Justice takes part in the proceedings and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 establishes the selection panel—this is what the new clause would abolish—chaired by the Lord Chief Justice who I think all Conservative Members would accept has had day-to-day experience throughout his working life.  [Interruption.] The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk might want to listen to this, as he seemed to have forgotten it in his remarks.
	As I say, the Lord Chief Justice chairs the selection panel, so I assume that the anonymous judge whom the hon. Gentleman quoted would be content with that. The Lord Chief Justice or his nominee chooses another judge—again, I hope our anonymous judge would be happy with that—and another lay member of the JAC. This system therefore puts two judges, with all the experience that the hon. Gentleman wanted to see deployed in the appointment of lords justices of appeal, in the driving seat in the selection of those judges. That is precisely what the new clause would remove. Even in terms of the hon. Gentleman's own argument, it does not fly.
	There are enormous benefits from having the Judicial Appointments Commission, but the hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mr. Timpson) has made various complaints about it. I would like to reinforce what the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome said to him when he pointed out that the fact that a system may not work perfectly does not mean that we have to ditch the whole system; we simply have to improve it. We have to decide first whether the system we have is better than the one we had before—and I think that it is, unarguably. It is unarguably better because it ensures greater levels of independence and transparency in the appointment process. I do not understand, particularly nowadays, how anyone—even those on the Conservative Benches—can argue against having greater independence and transparency in an appointments process.
	To clarify, the JAC appoints candidates solely on merit, so the various innuendos we heard floating around that judges were appointed on criteria other than merit are not right. This system works and continues to work well; of course it can work better; that is what we all want it to do.
	I could go through various arguments for and against the written tests. As hon. Members have said, there are arguments both for and against them, but it is worth bearing in mind that some recent selection processes had up to 1,000 candidates applying. We need a sifting process to deal with that. As to the comments about costs and all the rest of it, I ask hon. Members to reflect on how they would carry out the sift. Having a personal system of interviews is likely, as a first sift, to be considerably more expensive than a written test. Every business has to do this and the civil service adopts similar processes for its fast-stream.
	The key point is that I am deliberately not going to comment on the efficacy of the written tests. I invite hon. Members to reflect on it for themselves. The reason I am not going to do that is that doing so would be another instance of the Executive trampling into terrain that should properly be the preserve of the independent Judicial Appointments Commission.
	On Second Reading of the Constitutional Reform Bill, the Lord Chancellor said:
	"I will ensure that the definition of merit should be for the commission itself and not for Ministers."—[ Official Report, House of Lords, 8 March 2004; Vol. 658, c. 984.]
	The Act went on to recognise that, and the importance of the JAC and the judiciary, by providing that the JAC should determine its own selection processes. That is right and proper. That is our position, too. The JAC should determine its own processes. There are arguments for and against, which we could have until 7 o'clock, but I do not intend to do so.
	When I began my remarks, I referred to the traditional Conservative attitude towards constitutional reform. There is another tradition of Conservatism, which I invite the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk to discover: the tradition of progressive Conservatism of Disraeli and Lord Randolph Churchill. They would never have pressed such a new clause, so I invite the hon. Gentleman to rediscover that tradition and withdraw his new clause.

'(1) The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
	(2) Omit section 48.
	(3) Omit subsection (2) of section 49.
	(4) In subsection (1) of section 51, for "chief executive" substitute "President".
	(5) In subsection (1) of section 54, for "chief executive" substitute "President".'.— (Mr. Bellingham.)
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Henry Bellingham: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
	New clause 21 relates to the Supreme Court. Again, I declare an interest as a barrister. The background to the establishment of the new Supreme Court was due entirely to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the relevant section of which made it clear that the Supreme Court would be set up. Section 48 refers to appointing a chief executive.
	This reform was part of a wider package, which we discussed in detail on earlier new clauses, and I do not want to repeat those discussions. It is worth pointing out, however, that the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords—the Law Lords, as they were known—did a first-class job. No one complained that they were not doing a good job. No one complained that their location in any way inhibited or restricted their professionalism or their work. They started off, many years ago, in the main Chamber of the House of Lords, but as pressure on business increased they were exiled to a Committee room on Committee corridor.

Henry Bellingham: I will come on to that quickly, and I am grateful to you, Mrs. Anderson, for that reminder. Obviously, it is difficult to explain what the chief executive is about without looking at what the chief executive does, which is preside over the Supreme Court on which the former Law Lords are judges.
	Although one might well have taken the view that it was quaint, quirky, anachronistic and so on to have Law Lords sitting in a small Committee room, the arrangement worked very well. However, it was decided that they should be moved across to the new Supreme Court. Obviously, that decision was taken at a time when the economy was booming, and no one worried too much about the costs. The original estimated cost was £30 million, which then went up. As we know, the ultimate capital cost of the Supreme Court came in at £58.9 million: a vast amount of money to locate those judges in a new building when they had a perfectly good place to sit already. I believe that only one Law Lord agreed, and publicly stated, that it was a good idea to move across to the Supreme Court. The other Law Lords were all opposed to the move. They felt that the existing arrangements worked extremely well.
	I will not dwell on the capital costs, however, because I want to consider the current costs of running the new Supreme Court. Let us consider the previous arrangements that were in place in the House of Lords. Of course, it is difficult to work out exactly what the costs were, but the cost of the Clerks, the Librarian and the other officials who serviced the Law Lords amounted to roughly £600,000. That was not a huge sum, and I think that it represented very good value for money. Back in July it was announced in a written parliamentary answer that the running costs of the new Supreme Court would be £12.3 million. That is a pretty staggering figure compared with £600,000. The new chief executive, who is the subject of new clause 21 —

Henry Bellingham: I am certainly confident that I am comparing like with like. The actual costs of running the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords amounted to £600,000.

Henry Bellingham: Yes—the actual administrative costs: the running costs. As  Hansard shows, in 2005 the Minister replying to the debate in the House of Lords agreed that the actual costs amounted to £600,000. Obviously the costs of the salaries and pensions of the Law Lords were additional to that. The original figure given for the running costs of the Supreme Court back in July was £12.3 million, to which must be added the salaries and pensions of the Law Lords. Between July and September, that figure rose to £13.5 million. May I ask the Minister who is in charge of these costs? Who is controlling them?
	Six full-time staff serviced the Law Lords, and I think that they did a very good job in looking after their interests. There are 39 people in the new Supreme Court. The other day I tabled a parliamentary question asking
	"how many employees of the new Supreme Court earn more than  (a) £50,000,  (b) £75,000 and  (c) £100,000 a year."
	The reply was as follows:
	"The Supreme Court has 39 employees. Of those 39 employees, four earn between £50,000 and £75,000, one earns between £75,000 and £100,000, and one earns more than £100,000."—[ Official Report, 2 November 2009; Vol. 498, c. 747W.]
	The employee who earns more than £100,000 is the chief executive.
	I take on board what the Minister has said about the separation of powers, but I disagree with it profoundly. I have always taken the view that we do not have an American-style separation of powers in this country. Our judiciary has always been entwined with the legislature: that is one of the great strengths that our constitution has had for many years. Do we really need 39 employees to run the Supreme Court in that fantastic building across the way? Do we really need a chief executive who is paid a salary of more than £100,000? Perhaps it is £140,000; I do not know. Certainly it is far more than the Minister earns. Why do we need a chief executive?
	The new clause seeks to make a start—a small start—on reducing the costs of the Supreme Court. I do not think that there is any justification for increasing the number of staff from six to 39, or for appointing a chief executive. What will the chief executive do? What will the director of finance do? What will the director of communications and the other directors do? Why cannot the Supreme Court be run with a senior Clerk, perhaps a few caretakers and a couple of librarians? Let us get the cost down to a sensible level.
	As the Minister well knows, the Conservatives would not have gone down the Supreme Court route. On the other hand, we are pragmatic politicians. We are not going to simply scrap the arrangement and spend a lot of money on reversing these changes. What we do want to do, if we win the election, is ensure that the court works more efficiently and gives better value for money. We do not believe that a cost of more than £13.5 million, and probably rising, represents good value for money.

Henry Bellingham: The hon. Gentleman is a distinguished academic and we have debated such issues many times. He will remember that when he and I started out on our legal careers, judges ran their own courts. Long before Her Majesty's Courts Service—employing 20,000-plus people—judges ran their courts, and they exercised control of all aspects of their administration. Those judges would run large combined courts, employing substantial numbers of people and manage a very complex case load—and they would also manage large numbers of litigants, solicitors and barristers who came before the court on a daily basis.
	On the Supreme Court, I entirely accept what the hon. Gentleman says. We do not want its president to be bogged down with a huge amount of administration and a lot of minor detail. That is why he needs to have a staff, but does he need a staff of 39, and does he need a chief executive? I suggest that this modest proposal of removing the post of chief executive would be a very good start, because it would send a signal to the Supreme Court that it must deliver value for money and be run efficiently.
	Furthermore, let us take another look at the Department's budget, which is under immense pressure. There are court buildings that need to be repaired, the legal aid budget is in crisis, there is a crisis over access to justice, law centres and advice centres are closing by the dozen, legal aid deserts are appearing, and young lawyers are forsaking publicly funded work, and all because tiny amounts of money are being taken out of the legal aid budget. Yet here we are looking at the running costs of the ultimate appeal court in the land going up from about £600,000 to almost £14 million, employing a chief executive on a very large salary in a post that my party thinks is superfluous to requirements. The new clause has been proposed in the spirit of trying to get better value for money and making sure that the delivery of justice in this country is more streamlined and efficient—which is exactly what the Minister said that he wants too.

David Heath: I was expecting a totally different argument from the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham). I thought he was going to present an argument with which I have a degree of sympathy. Indeed, given the words on the amendment paper, I can still make his new clause fit my aspirations—but for the wrong reasons, it would appear. I thought he was trying to make sure that the role of the chief executive and the running of the Supreme Court were transferred solely to the authority of the president of the Supreme Court, thus cutting out the middleman, the Lord High Chancellor, who is responsible at present for the staffing levels the hon. Gentleman has described and for the salary enjoyed by the chief executive. At present, the whole shebang is nothing to do with the president, other than in a consultative capacity. It is all down to the Lord High Chancellor, who has made his decisions about the proposals.
	I thought the hon. Gentleman would express support for the ongoing process of separating out the legislature and the Executive from the courts by giving the courts proper responsibility for running their own affairs in this discrete aspect. I have heard the arguments, however, and I now understand that he wants to do exactly the opposite. He wants this House to interfere with the running of the Supreme Court and its president to undertake a new raft of functions that involve making sure the lights are switched off and the boiler is mended. I am not sure that that is a sensible use of the time of the president of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk believes that it is, but his argument in favour is based on costs that sounded rather speculative to me. He cited some figures—I shall be interested in what the Minister has to say about those—but the comparison being made did not seem to be exactly like for like; I did not note, for example, any property costs in terms of housing the Law Lords in the House of Lords. That apparently costs nothing at all and is, thus, not to be used as a comparator, and I suspect that some of the hon. Gentleman's other arguments are not entirely accurate.
	However, the hon. Gentleman has a point, in that having the building across the road and running two buildings, rather than one, entails an increased cost. I think that that cost is justified. I was one of those who always argued for a supreme court and who always argued that it was an extraordinary anomaly that the Law Lords sat within our legislature, thus making it very difficult for us to defend our position compared with most modern political and judicial systems. I was one of the first to suggest the Middlesex Guildhall as a suitable venue —[Interruption.] Yes, it was my fault; I accept responsibility. I thought it was a good building to put the Supreme Court in and, having seen it, I remain of that view. With the exception of the carpets, it is a marvellous adaptation of a very suitable building for its purpose.

Henry Bellingham: rose—

Henry Bellingham: The hon. Gentleman obviously never appeared before a Crown court judge in that building when it was a Crown court. It was a lugubrious, grotty building then, but I agree that the work has been done to a very high standard, and the architects need congratulating. Obviously, as £60 million has been spent, one would expect a Rolls-Royce building, and that is what we have got.

David Heath: We have got an excellent building. Those who represent the top of this country's judicial processes deserve an appropriate building. Far from being lugubrious, I suspect that it is now a rather good place to work. It has retained the best features of the Middlesex Guildhall intact; I am particularly pleased that the building contains a very prominent portrait—there might be two in the building—of John Fielding of Somersetshire, who did so much to establish our modern judiciary and the role of modern courts.
	I am a great supporter of the Supreme Court and of how it has developed. Should it be for the Lord Chancellor now to have any involvement in the day-to-day running of that court? My answer to that is no. However, although I thought that I could have couched the hon. Gentleman's new clause in more felicitous terms, it would achieve a result that I could support. That leaves me in a great dilemma were he to call a Division, because were I to support him it would be for reasons almost diametrically opposed to those for which he believes his proposal is necessary. I would be tainted by association with his arguments and I do not want that, nor do I want my hon. and right hon. Friends to be so tainted.
	I hope that the Minister will advance such a strong argument in rebuttal that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his new clause. I also hope that on another occasion we will look at properly strengthening the role of the president of the Supreme Court, not by making him empty the dustbins, but by allowing him to appoint his own staff. He should make the dispositions on staffing and any other arrangements of the Supreme Court that he thinks best, rather than come back to the Lord Chancellor to ask for permission. I would support amendments along those lines, because having set up this new body, with which we should be very pleased, now is the time for the Lord Chancellor to let go.
	That takes us back to the debates that we had earlier this afternoon and the reluctance, it would seem, of the Executive entirely to let go of matters that are within their power. I hope that the Minister will be able to tell us that in the long term that is precisely what the Government intend to do.

Henry Bellingham: The Minister has challenged me, and I shall investigate this fully, but surely the point is that the Law Lords shared our security, which was in place anyway to protect the many thousands of people who use this Palace, and our facilities. One would often see Law Lords going down to the Terrace cafeteria for a snack. The cost was obviously heavily subsidised, because they were one—or 12—of a large number of people using the facilities. Now they have their own dedicated facilities, and of course it costs much more.

Michael Wills: When I say like for like, I know that the running costs are not exactly the same and that of course there will be savings in both cases. The Supreme Court is a new building and will almost certainly be far more energy-efficient than this building. Of course, capital costs go into that and they have to be amortised over a certain period of time. These calculations are highly complex but for a relatively small institution the difference in the running costs—it is just a matter of common sense—is unlikely to be that great. There would be savings in some areas if it were to remain here and savings in others if it were transferred to a more modern building with all the efficiencies that come with such buildings, as compared with largely unrefurbished great historic buildings, such as this one, where it is a patch and mend job all the time. I urge the hon. Gentleman to use some common sense, because the actual differences are unlikely to be very significant.

Edward Timpson: I take the Minister's point about the Supreme Court's being the apex of our judicial system, but most members of the public who have to access our judicial system tend to do so at the lower end—in the magistrates courts and family proceedings courts. When they see their magistrates courts in a poor state of repair and, on occasions, see them closing, it makes it even more important that the cost of the Supreme Court—every penny—is justified. When we hear sums for running costs in the region of £13 million, compared with what it would cost to run a local magistrates court, it is important that that case is made clearly and forensically. I suspect that that is the point that my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) is trying to make, to ensure that we are getting value for money.

Michael Wills: Of course we must get value for money, which is exactly what I said. As I shall describe in a moment, that is one of the functions of the chief executive.
	The Supreme Court has been established in a proper and effective way, with the staff that it needs to discharge its essential function in our constitution. All the rest of the judicial system depends on it, as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk well knows. It is not a question of either/or: we continue to invest in the court service, and it is well known that magistrates courts close for whole complexes of reasons. The needs of the justice system change, and that is a key reason why magistrates courts change. Magistrates courts are not having to close because of the establishment of the Supreme Court, but of course there has to be value for money.
	If the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk can justify his claim that costs have increased twentyfold, of course I will look at it, but I confidently assure him that they have not. The equation is complex, and I do not want to mislead the Committee. We have to give the figures out in accordance with the highest standards of accountancy, and the way that costs have been amortised in this building renders that difficult.
	I am not sure whether it is worth going to the effort of translating the entire argument down into the costs equation, as in the end this is a political debating point. I believe that the difference in running costs is unlikely to be large, and I suspect that the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk thinks so, too.
	The new clause is technically defective—

Michael Wills: No, as I want to come to the real burden of my remarks. We have spent quite a lot of time on what even the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said was a modest proposal, so I would like to make the main points of my argument against it. If the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) still wants to intervene after I have made some progress, I will of course give way to him.
	The main problem with new clause 22 is that it still fails the separation of powers test. The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said—although I am not sure that he really meant it—that he welcomes how the legislature has become tangled up with the higher reaches of the judiciary. I accept that there has been a certain entanglement, but I certainly do not welcome it, and I think that the British people do not want it. One of the greatest protections of their liberties is that the legislature and the judiciary are not entangled. We are continuing the process of disentangling them as far as we possibly can, and that is the purpose of the establishment of the Supreme Court. I do not want to rehearse all the arguments again, but it is very important that we set out exactly what the chief executive does, as that is the core of the problem.
	The statute says that it is for the chief executive to manage the non-judicial functions of the Supreme Court, so that its resources are used to provide an efficient and effective system to support it in carrying out its business. I think that everyone should accept that there is a function there to be performed. The chief executive works under the President of the Supreme Court, and again I hope that everyone accepts that, if there is to be a chief executive, that is the correct way for the arrangement to operate.
	The new clause would increase substantially the time that the President of the Supreme Court must spend managing the non-judicial aspects of the court's functions, thereby reducing the time that this individual—ex officio, they will be talented, skilled and experienced—has to spend on the crucial judicial work that is the court's core role.
	The new clause also would undermine the very independence that the Supreme Court was founded on. I believe that it is very important that we have a Supreme Court, and that its independence is protected. In the first Constitutional Affairs Committee report of the 2003-04 Session, the Law Lords made it clear that they unanimously regarded it as essential that the court enjoyed corporate independence. They said that
	"the independence of the judges requires not only that they be free of extraneous pressure but also that the court be institutionally free of administrative pressure".
	To that end, the court has been established as a non-ministerial department with its own chief executive, who is also the court's accounting officer, to ensure that there can be no question of interference by the Executive in its day-to-day running. The chief executive, which the new clause would abolish, plays a key role in managing appropriate relationships between the court and branches of Government throughout the UK and assuring proper accountability for the use of public resources—of course, there must be such accountability.
	If the function were abolished, the Lord Chancellor would have to provide support along the lines of sections 1 and 2 of the Courts Act 2003, which set out the general duty on the Lord Chancellor to ensure that there is an efficient and effective system to support the business of the senior courts, county courts and magistrates courts, and that appropriate services are provided for those courts.
	Since the new clause does not remove other related provisions of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, such as section 50, which requires the Lord Chancellor to provide accommodation and other resources, the removal of the chief executive role would bring all those financial accountability responsibilities back to the Lord Chancellor and the Ministry of Justice, compromising the independence of the Supreme Court, cutting right across the justices' own requirements for managerial and financial independence, and re-entangling the legislature and the Executive with the judiciary in precisely the way that we think it is right that they should be disentangled.
	Finally, the amendment is defective as it leaves intact section 51 of the Act under which the chief executive is responsible for ensuring that
	"the Court's resources are used to provide an efficient and effective system to support the Court's business".
	For all those reasons, I hope the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) will withdraw the new clause.

'(1) Section 88 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
	(2) After subsection (5) insert—
	"(6) At no stage during any selection procedure may the Commission apply any written tests."'.— (Mr. Bellingham.)
	 Brought up, and read the First time.
	 Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
	 The Committee divided: Ayes 150, Noes 329.

Kelvin Hopkins: I beg to move amendment 68, page 18, line 19, at end add—
	'(9) The principal function of the Comptroller and Auditor General is to further the purposes of national audit set out in section [Purpose of Part 7] by way of investigation and report.'.

Alan Haselhurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 78, in clause 38, page 19, line 2, at end insert—
	'(6A) The Comptroller and Auditor General shall also have discretion to examine the accounts of any organisation supplying goods or services paid for out of public funds, which within any one contract, or any one financial year, exceed a sum to be determined from time to time by statutory instrument.'.
	New clause 41— Purpose of Part 7—
	'The purpose of the following provisions is to further strengthen Parliamentary control and supervision of the expenditure of public money, and for promoting economy, efficiently, effectiveness and probity in the use of such money by government departments and other authorities and organisations.'.

Kelvin Hopkins: Clearly my right hon. Friend and I disagree, but I hope it will be accepted that the restatement of the 1983 Act would not go amiss in the Bill.
	New clause 41 is intended to be inserted at the head of part 7. It repeats the opening of the 1983 Act, with the addition of the word "probity", which seems appropriate in current terms. Amendment 68 is intended to make clear the function of the Comptroller and Auditor General in relation to the purposes of national audit, and amendment 78 takes account of the modern circumstances in which private firms and third-sector organisations can receive a significant proportion of their funds—up to 80 per cent. in some cases—from the public purse. When the services that they provide were provided directly by public authorities, they were subject to the Comptroller and Auditor General or to local government audit. Modern suppliers of services receiving public money should be subject to the CAG, as plcs will be under clause 50.
	It is important to reassert the importance of the CAG and national audit. In the last Parliament, there was a brief, surreptitious attempt by the Government to insert a degree of Treasury control over national audit. That was seen off by a combination of Labour Members, Opposition Members and the House of Lords, and the Bill never proceeded, but it is important that we now reaffirm our commitment to national audit. After all, our primary purpose is to vote moneys for government on behalf of the people. We must ensure that what moneys we vote are spent appropriately. That is what national audit and the CAG are all about.

David Gauke: I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling these amendments and the new clause. I suspect that the question whether it is necessary to reassert such objectives in this Bill given that the 1983 Act, which also states them, is not being repealed, will be addressed in a moment, but the CAG's objective of carrying out examinations of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public bodies is, as the hon. Gentleman says, very important. Perhaps it is more important now than ever, at a time when we will see spending restraint. The Government are spending more than ever before and, indeed, borrowing more than ever before in peacetime, so the focus must clearly be on achieving more for less. The NAO and the CAG have an important role in achieving that. Taxpayer value for money should unite us all—it should not be a partisan point—whether we are left or right. I do not think the hon. Gentleman will take it as a criticism if I say that it does not get more left wing than him. We must all ensure that public spending achieves good value and it is worth paying tribute to the work that the NAO and various CAGs have performed to achieve that.
	We may differ on how to achieve greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness in public bodies, and in many ways, this is a matter for great political debate—I am sure the hon. Gentleman would not necessarily share the Conservatives' views about the importance of choice, competition and contestability in achieving better value for money. However, there is a less political role, and the NAO performs it very well, in conjunction with the Public Accounts Committee. The new clause refers to Parliament's important role. As I said, we could question whether the amendments are necessary, but the objective of the NAO and the CAG is important.
	I have one or two points to make on clause 37. If there is a stand part debate on it, I will do so then.

David Gauke: In which case, Sir Alan, I shall make those points now.
	This part of the Bill, as the Father of the House has said, is predominantly to do with the governance of the NAO and the CAG, and there is a combination of continuity and change in the new arrangements. I think it would be fair to provide a little background on how we got into this situation and why there was a need to look again at the governance of the CAG—doubtless the Chairman of the PAC, my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), and the Father of the House will say things to the same effect.
	We cannot ignore the fact that there was some adverse publicity regarding the expenses of Sir John Bourn, who was CAG for some 20 years or so. It is a great pity that there was a cloud over the last few months of his service, because he was a distinguished Comptroller and Auditor General. He did much to enhance the reputation of the National Audit Office and worked very effectively with the Public Accounts Committee. Nevertheless, there was some concern and adverse publicity over his expenses, which in many respects led to the commissioning of the Tiner review and various recommendations made as to the governance of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the NAO.
	I wish to make various points about corporate governance at a later stage, but two points are appropriate to address in the context of clause 37. The first is the length of term of the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the second is the appointment process. Clause 37(7) provides that the length of term should be 10 years and subsection (8) provides that it should be non-renewable. We welcome those provisions. The tension that exists in the Government's arrangements in this area relates to independence and accountability, and that is a point to which we may return later. However, a non-renewable term of a reasonable length gives the CAG a degree of independence. The Tiner review initially suggested eight years, and we now have 10 years in the Bill. No doubt others will explain the reason for that change, but it is not enormously significant. We welcome those provisions.
	The issue of the appointment process has been touched on recently in a couple of debates when new Comptrollers and Auditors General have been appointed. I have had the opportunity to speak in both debates—first, on the temporary appointment of Mr. Tim Burr in January 2008, and secondly, on the appointment of Mr. Amyas Morse as the permanent CAG. The debate has centred on whether the existing structure, which has been in place since 1983—by which time the appointment was made by a combination of the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee and the Prime Minister—is appropriate or whether Parliament should have a wider role, and remove the Prime Minister and the Executive from the process, either altogether or with a diminished role.
	Another issue is whether pre-appointment hearings should be introduced. This is not a new debate. In the debate that took place when Sir John Bourn was appointed, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury, the right hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, East and Wallsend (Mr. Brown), then the Opposition spokesman, said, on the question of a greater role for Parliament:
	"The Labour party intends to give effect to this principle when in government."—[ Official Report, 16 December 1987; Vol. 124, c. 1201.]
	The argument for that approach is that we should have greater parliamentary involvement in public appointments. It is an argument that the Prime Minister espoused in his very first statement to this House as Prime Minister. It is one with which I have some sympathy, as it seems to be a more democratic approach, but there are specific arguments that apply in this context that suggest that the continuation of the present system may be a sensible approach.
	The first argument is that the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee is a member of the Opposition. That is a long-standing convention, and one that I am sure will continue. The Chairman has a substantial role in determining an appointment. In fact, by and large, as I understand it, in practice the Chairman essentially makes the selection, which is then approved by the Prime Minister.
	It is important that the CAG is seen as independent of the Executive, and an appointment made by a senior Opposition Member demonstrates an important degree of independence.

David Gauke: I am grateful for my hon. Friend's intervention. That would be an interesting structure, although I would be reluctant for the CAG to perform that role. Although the CAG and whoever would be in charge of the office for budget responsibility would play an important role in budget responsibility, I would not want to complicate the role of the CAG because it is a substantial job in itself. Furthermore, the skills required of the CAG—being able to identify waste in specific programmes—involve performing a role at a micro level in identifying particular problems, whereas we envisage the office for budget responsibility working at much more of a macro level. It would be a role for an economist to assess the needs of the Government in reducing the deficit, and the progress—or lack of—made by the Government in achieving those objectives. The parallel is strong in that both roles require a high degree of independence to have the credibility required to perform successfully.

Oliver Heald: My first thought was that, to assess the sustainability of public finances, we need expert economists, as my hon. Friend just said. However, there would be two other aspects of the role of the new office: to audit fully the national debt—or debts—and to enforce a long-term strategy of value for money in public spending. Those fit in well with the role of the CAG. Would there be any logic to giving him that role? I simply cast out that thought to him.

David Gauke: I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and I am sure that his points will be noted. Both roles would be important. It is helpful to the Committee highlight the significance of the office for budget responsibility, and I think that we agree on the significant role that it would play—I hope—in addressing the current huge levels of borrowing. I hope that it would be important, just as the CAG has been important.
	On clause 37, we think, on balance, that the result that we have got to, which is largely a continuation of the previous process, is an important one. We are pleased that it remains a requirement for the Prime Minister to move the motion for the appointment of the CAG. As I said, I have had the pleasure of responding to the Prime Minister twice when he has performed that role—I am sure that he was delighted to have that opportunity too. All being well, however, such a motion should not happen very often—once in 10 years, as the Bill envisages—although it is always possible that things will not go entirely to plan. Because of the independence provided by the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, there is a danger that the existing independence might be diminished in those circumstances by a straight vote in Parliament—whether a vote in Committee or a vote by the whole House—given that the Government will always be the majority party. Consequently, we welcome clause 37.

Edward Leigh: I rise to speak in favour of clause 37, which covers the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, and to oppose amendments 68 and 78, and new clause 41.
	A number of provisions already protect the independence of the post holder, including the appointment process, the length of tenure and the terms of the appointment. Let me start with some context, so that we can understand the significance of the legislation, why it is important to be clear about the purpose of the Bill and why we must tread carefully in this territory.
	The Comptroller and Auditor General is an Officer of the House of Commons. He is not a civil servant and is completely independent of the Government. Uniquely, he is selected by the Government and the Opposition. He reports to Parliament on the activities of the Government and his work is overseen largely by the Public Accounts Committee—the oldest Committee in Parliament, which was set up 150 years ago—which is always chaired by a member of the Opposition. Therefore, there are a number of locks throughout the process to ensure the independence of the Comptroller and Auditor General.
	All those arrangements are supported by complex legislative structures and significant parliamentary conventions, many of which have existed for a long time. The result of all those conventions and laws, as well as what we are talking about in clause 37, is to enable the Comptroller and Auditor General to function absolutely independently of the Government. That is what they all do. He must have complete discretion in how he carries out his functions.
	I worked closely with the Father of the House, after the retirement of Sir John Bourn. We were clear at all times that we must not mess with the traditional independence of the Comptroller and Auditor General. There may be an opportunity later to discuss the corporate structure and all the rest of it, but the fundamental point is that the Comptroller and Auditor General is completely independent of the Government and that he alone and nobody else—not the Public Accounts Committee and not the board of the National Audit Office—signs off the reports. Nobody else can affect his judgments. He is completely independent, and that is vital.
	That statutory independence, which is underpinned by the new Bill, is not a notional phenomenon, shrouded in cobwebs and dating back centuries, or at least back to Gladstone. Rather, it is real, it is current and it forms a key plank of our constitutional fabric. One only has to look around the world at what has happened in other countries to know how important it is—indeed, vital—to have an independent supreme audit office. Every country has a supreme audit office, but not all of them are as independent or effective as ours. Indeed, ours is arguably the best in the world.
	I am therefore pleased that the current arrangements, whereby the Comptroller and Auditor General's appointment is proposed by the Prime Minister following consultation with the Chairman of the PAC, have endured—I say "consultation", but it goes much further than that. Frankly, they both have a veto. This gentleman—Amyas Morse, although the Comptroller and Auditor General may be a lady in the future; we do not know—can be appointed only if the Prime Minister, who is obviously a member of the Government by definition, and the Chairman of the PAC, who by convention is a member of the Opposition, both agree.
	In fact, in appointing the current Comptroller and Auditor General we improved the process further. Last time, when Sir John Bourn was appointed, my predecessor, Bob Sheldon—now Lord Sheldon—was given a list by the civil service and he interviewed the candidates in his flat. It was a closed process. We now have an open competition, and this time there were a number of advertisements, and anyone could apply. The interviews were carried out at length by myself and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, who represented the Prime Minister. I would like to thank the permanent secretary for the many hours of work that he put into this. By that stage, we had already appointed the new chairman of the National Audit Office, Sir Andrew Likierman, and he was also involved in the latter part of the process. We had an open competition with a number of good candidates, and I believe that we came out with the best.

Edward Leigh: The chairman's role was simply to advise. He is a very distinguished gentleman—he is the dean of the London Business School, and he was head of the Government resources office in the Treasury—and he simply gave me advice. Obviously, I am not going to reveal who was on the shortlist or what happened in the discussions, but I can say that, ultimately, the decision was mine and no one else's. I listened to his advice and that of Tim Burr, the then Comptroller and Auditor General, who was also on the selection panel as he was not a candidate himself. Nick Macpherson, the permanent secretary to the Treasury, also gave me his advice. I chaired the meeting, and I made the decision: I appointed the new Comptroller and Auditor General.
	Then, however, my decision had to go to the Prime Minister, and I give him credit for acting promptly, because, within a week, he had approved the appointment. So he, too, had a lock on the process. Of course, it is not surprising that he approved the appointment, because Nick Macpherson was part of the process. If I had insisted on appointing someone who was obviously not qualified, the Prime Minister would have vetoed it. So we each had a lock on it, and that is a very good process.
	It might sound democratic to suggest that the House as a whole should vote for the Comptroller and Auditor General, but that would go against everything that I have been arguing for—namely, that the Opposition and the Government should both have a lock on the process. If the House as a whole voted on the appointment, the Government party would effectively appoint him.

Edward Leigh: It was the same process. I am grateful to the Father of the House for his generous offer to surrender his right to appoint the chairman of the National Audit Office, along with the Prime Minister; that was what was originally proposed. We immediately spotted the problem that he has just alluded to—namely, that that would effectively mean that the Government party would appoint the chairman. The right hon. Gentleman therefore immediately, and very generously, surrendered that right. Just as there was an appointment panel for the Comptroller and Auditor General, there was also one previously for the chairman. Again, the Prime Minister, as a member of the Government, and I, as a member of the Opposition, had a lock on that process. So I think that we have the right structure.
	The independence of the Comptroller and Auditor General is guaranteed by a jigsaw of measures that hang together as a whole, and we should be very wary of unpicking any one part of it without careful consideration. We do not know what is going to happen in the future. There could be some kind of appalling financial scandal at the heart of the Government, for example, and it is absolutely essential that this man—or lady—is completely independent.
	Central to this has always been the fact that the Comptroller and Auditor General also has tenure of appointment and, like a judge, cannot be removed from office except on a vote of the entire House of Commons. The Public Accounts Commission, which I also sit on—it is, of course, separate from the Public Accounts Committee—has concluded that the current unlimited appointment was "anachronistic". I do not think that when Sir John Bourn was appointed anyone spotted that the civil service retirement age at the time was 60: it was rigidly enforced; all senior civil servants had to retire at 60.

Edward Leigh: I should have made that clear; it is a very important point. In other words, it is virtually impossible to get rid of him. That is absolutely right.
	I was saying that the previous appointment was anachronistic and that no one spotted at the time Sir John Bourn was appointed that even though the civil service retirement age was 60, he could basically go on. I had a very good relationship with Sir John Bourn, who was outstanding public servant. Frankly, however, let us be honest about it, 20 years is perhaps too long. The equivalent office in the United States has a fixed single term of 15 years, which we also thought was too long. The Public Accounts Commission thus concluded that a fixed term of 10 years was appropriate. There was some argument over whether it should be eight or 10 years. I think that the Government probably favoured eight years and I would have been happy with eight years, but 10 years is a real good length of time to make one's mark—it could span three, certainly two, Governments.
	It is very important that this appointment be non-renewable. We do not want the CAG to suffer the fate of all US Presidents and most new Prime Ministers where the first term is overshadowed by the need to be re-elected. This chap owes nothing to anybody. Nobody can sack him—short of he or she having a hand in the till—and nobody can get rid of him; he is there for 10 years and then he retires.
	We need to take great care before tampering with any of the founding legislation, which was carefully drawn to provide broad rights of access and reporting and to safeguard the independence of the CAG as an Officer of the House and the external auditor of the Government. That is not to say that no aspect of the arrangements can be improved upon. I am in favour of the changes proposed in the Bill. I think that the arrangement is being improved, but we need to take great care and to be alert to our old friends—the unintended consequences.
	The Public Accounts Commission has worked very closely with the Government to ensure that the clauses improve the governance arrangements of the National Audit Office. I pay tribute to the Government for adopting all that the commission proposed; there was complete agreement within it, as well. We should also pay tribute to the fact that the Government, working with the commission, have ensured that we are not going to undermine the audit independence of the CAG.
	The commission agreed that it was possible to separate the internal governance—this is a very important point—of the NAO from the responsibility for making audit judgments, but we recognised that to do so required arrangements that were unique among the panoply of organisational models used in 21st century Britain. What the Father of the House and myself were absolutely determined to avoid was some kind of new corporate structure in which a board could affect the independence and audit judgments of the CAG. I know that there has been some debate about this, and some worries that we were creating something like the Audit Commission—we are not. The CAG is completely independent. This board will deal only with the organisational structure of the body.
	The Bill thus proposes no changes that will affect the work—the real and important work—of the CAG in the audit of Government accounts or in the 60 reports on value for money that he makes to the Public Accounts Committee every year. He remains independent. He alone will be responsible for all audit judgments; he alone will maintain complete discretion in the discharge of his office. His access rights are not affected and the results of his work will continue to be reported in full to Parliament through the Public Accounts Committee.

Edward Leigh: I hope that I am not giving away any confidences by saying that Amyas Morse told me this week that it can be a very lonely job—and, as I have described it, a very important one—and he welcomes the advice of the chairman of the board, Sir Andrew Likierman. The Comptroller and Auditor General can go to him in confidence at any time and ask for his support and advice. However, the arrangement is unique: although Sir Andrew Likierman can give his advice, the buck ultimately stops with the Comptroller and Auditor General.
	The Comptroller and Auditor General has a large staff of 800 people who help him to write reports, but he puts his signature on the document, and it is his document and his alone. The board will be involved, for instance, in appointments, such as deciding who should be deputy Comptroller and Auditor General, what the travel arrangements of the Comptroller and Auditor General should be, and what should be the size of the staff. It was wrong that, under the previous incarnation of Sir John Bourn, who was a fine public servant, the Comptroller and Auditor General was a complete dictator—that was always the case; Sir John did not change anything in that regard. He not only had complete independence on his audit judgment, which is right, but appointed all the deputy Comptroller and Auditor Generals, decided the travel arrangements and everything else. In the modern world, one cannot go down that route. One must have a modern corporate structure, involving a board, as long as the board does not tell the Comptroller and Auditor General what to do in relation to his audit judgments.

Edward Leigh: As I understand it, morale in the National Audit Office is now very high. It went through a sticky patch—there is no point denying it—and there was bad publicity, much of it unfair, but that is now past us. Morale is high and people feel that the structure is fair and open, that people are appointed entirely on ability, and that their career is judged by a number of people sitting on the board, the chairman and the non-executive directors. I believe that we have got it right, and for that reason, I oppose the amendments, as they serve to define the Comptroller and Auditor General's audit purpose and to open up discussion of his access rights, neither of which was covered by the review commissioned by the Public Accounts Commission that led to this part of the Bill.
	We do not need to define the Comptroller and Auditor General's access rights. He has all the access he needs. Make no mistake: the National Audit Office can interview any civil servant, open any filing cabinet, and report on anything it likes. Having been Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, I assure the House that no restraint or inhibition is placed on the Comptroller and Auditor General doing his job. Clause 37 is right, and gives him the power he needs.

David Howarth: May I say that I was immensely reassured by the speech of the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee? It is vital that the Comptroller and Auditor General remains absolutely independent in judgment. Whatever the governance arrangements and administrative structure built up behind the Comptroller and Auditor General, his judgments—perhaps hers in the future—on reports must be independent. As the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee said, that is built into the entire structure, the cross-party nature of the appointment and the nature of the office.
	I shall not pursue the argument about the overall structure of the Bill. I fully accept that the commission and the Government have struck the right balance in relation to the NAO and its board, so I shall not detain the Committee for long. I intend simply to comment on the amendments and new clause, and to ask a question about the application of clause 37 which I hope the Minister will be able to answer.
	I agree with the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee that it would not be a good idea to define the functions of the Comptroller and Auditor General too closely. Any such definition might result in a restriction that we would not want to see. However, I think it worth asking about a particular aspect of new clause 41. The new clause states:
	"The purpose of the following provisions is to further strengthen Parliamentary control and supervision of the expenditure of public money".
	One of the problems that I see with the present structure, not in theory but in practice, is that it is far better at supervision than control. In other words, it is far better at looking back than looking forward. The Comptroller and Auditor General has two roles. The job of Comptroller is the forward-looking job of ensuring that the Government do not obtain the public's money for purposes that have not been authorised by the House, while the job of Auditor General is that of looking back to see whether that money has been properly spent. I think that, at some point, we must consider the important question whether the arrangements for the forward-looking role are as strong as they could be, and as strong as the arrangements for the backward-looking role.
	I disagree with the PAC Chairman about amendment 78. The hon. Member for Luton, North (Kelvin Hopkins) made clear that what concerned him was the problem of bodies which are not, in organisational form, public bodies at all but private trusts or companies of various sorts, but which are in reality carrying out public functions. That is the whole point of the discussion of contracting out. I think that the Chairman was referring to issues relating to non-departmental bodies, in respect of which the National Audit Act lays down clear guidelines on the Comptroller and Auditor General's powers. I understand that there is no power of the kind that the hon. Member for Luton, North is suggesting in the existing legislation. The point is that there should not be anything in the way in which we set up our audit arrangements that biases the entire system in favour of contracting out. Similarly, there should be no bias against contracting out.
	It seems to me—and I think the amendment raises this point—that an immensely effective audit system involving great powers, which successfully terrorises public officials into compliance with their duties but does not apply to private organisations that carry out state functions under contracting-out arrangements, effectively gives those organisations a huge advantage over the state.

David Howarth: That is absolutely right. The purpose is thought to be only to audit the Government Department and not to have any access to the private body, but I think that is a problem under current arrangements. As I remember it—I might be wrong on this—if a Minister agrees and the body agrees, there is further possibility of an audit of a private body. I am, however, unsure whether that is often invoked.
	The problem that has been identified is worth thinking about, but I am unsure whether the proposed solution is the right way to deal with it, as that is a discretion at large, which might produce problems in itself.

Philip Dunne: I do not intend to detain the Committee for long, but I would like to follow up the observation I made to the Chairman of the PAC, my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh). He has described the process governing the first appointment under this legislation—although it has not been enacted yet, of course. He said that the chairman of the NAO was able to offer his advice to both the Chairman of the PAC and the Prime Minister, which is proper. However, I would like the Minister to explain what would happen if the NAO chairman were unhappy about the appointment being made. There seems to be no provision in this clause for formal consultation; that just happened by way of practice rather than under statute. Does that not leave the NAO open to the possibility of having a fractious appointment imposed over the head of the chairman of the body?

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I can certainly confirm that that is the Government's intention. After all the work the Chair of the PAC has done on the appointment of the current Comptroller and Auditor General, he would be most unhappy if we had to go through the process all over again.
	The Bill provides for the establishment of a new corporate body—the new National Audit Office—whose functions will include providing resources for the Comptroller and Auditor General's functions, monitoring the execution of those functions and approving the provision of certain services. Importantly, the new NAO will be able to support and challenge constructively the CAG's decisions without, of course, preventing him from carrying out his statutory responsibilities.
	I come to the proposals made by my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, North (Kelvin Hopkins). As he was not feeling too well during the Second Reading debate, he did not get on to the points he wanted to make about the national audit provisions—I hope he is feeling better today. Amendment 68 would set out in statute that the principal function of the CAG is to further the purposes of national audit, which he set out in new clause 41. Amendment 78 would enable the CAG to have access to thousands of private sector companies that supply central Government. I thank the hon. Members for South-West Hertfordshire (Mr. Gauke), for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), for Cambridge (David Howarth) and for Ludlow (Mr. Dunne) for their contributions to this debate. Most who spoke this afternoon are of the same opinion; we welcome the contribution that these proposals have made to the debate, but the consensus is that they are not necessary. I shall now discuss the detail, where we have been extremely fortunate that the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee was able to share his insight into the appointments process.
	On new clause 41, of course the CAG exists to assist Parliament in holding the Government to account for the use that they make of public funds and, in doing so, promotes the objectives that my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, North mentions. I can assure him that the Government value that work as much as he does. I cannot dispute the fact that the effect of the arrangements in this part of the Bill will indirectly strengthen parliamentary scrutiny, but that is not their primary purpose.
	The Government are implementing the recommendations of the Public Accounts Commission's 15th report. In doing so, we are accepting the commission's two driving principles. The first is the need to ensure that the CAG has authority to form completely independent judgments about the audits and value-for-money studies conducted by the NAO. The second is the need for the NAO to maintain systems of governance and internal controls consistent with best practice. When we prepared the provisions in part 7, we took the utmost care not to jeopardise the CAG's independence in those areas.
	As now, the Public Accounts Commission will oversee the work of the CAG and the NAO—indeed, its role is increased by these reforms. However, it would be inaccurate to describe the main purpose of this part of the Bill as strengthening parliamentary control, because, as the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee said, its focus is rather on strengthening governance.
	I would add that the Government are doing a number of things to improve parliamentary scrutiny of government expenditure. Hon. Members will be aware that the Government provided a memorandum to the Liaison Committee in March containing formal proposals to Parliament for better alignment between budgets, estimates and accounts. The memorandum explained the plans to simplify the Government's financial reporting to Parliament, ensuring that they report in a more consistent, transparent and straightforward fashion on spending plans, estimates and expenditure outcomes. I hope to assure the hon. Member for Cambridge that further work on the way Parliament supervises expenditure continues in a number of ways, including through the work of the Select Committee on Reform of the House of Commons, which is expected to bring forward its proposals shortly.

David Gauke: Can the Minister explain, therefore, why the Government have, in recent years, refused to publish the whole of Government accounts? For the past two years the work has been done but the information has not been released—I believe that we are going to have to wait until 2010 for it.

Kelvin Hopkins: I give notice that I shall seek leave to withdraw amendment 68, but I want to make a few remarks in response to the debate. First, I thank my hon. Friend the Minister for her kind remarks about my health: it is improving but it is not quite there yet.
	The amendment has provoked a debate, and that is important. I was particularly impressed by the speech from the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee. I thought it was clear, strong and impressive, and it is good to restate these matters. I know that many people in this Committee share his view; I certainly do, and my intention with the amendment was to maximise the strength of the CAG and the NAO—I did not want to restrict either of them in any way. That intention was most true of amendment 78, which the Minister said was impracticable and unnecessary. However, there was an argument to be had and a point to be made, and I thank the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) for giving what I was saying a degree of support.
	I am absolutely passionate in my belief that we must make sure that the strength of the legislature in relation to the Executive is maintained—and, indeed, improved, as I do not think that it is strong enough now. The roles of the CAG and the NAO play a crucial part in that.
	I like to think that I have provoked a useful debate, and that I have made some points that needed to be made. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
	 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	 Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill .

David Gauke: Clause 38 deals with the status of the Comptroller and Auditor General. Subsection (8) highlights and signposts the provisions in clause 43 and schedule 6, and in clause 44 and schedule 7. It may be helpful to the Committee and reduce the time that we need to debate subsequent points if we address some concerns that have been expressed about the new governance structure. Those concerns have been raised in particular by Professor David Heald, who is a former adviser to the Public Accounts Commission. Perhaps, in the spirit of the hon. Member for Luton, North (Kelvin Hopkins), I can provoke a debate.
	Professor Heald's concern is that the role of Parliament may well be diminished by the creation of the NAO board. In an article he stated:
	"This insertion of the NAO Board between the Public Accounts Commission and the CaAG creates dangers. Governments might use the chair and board as a means of curtailing the activities of the comptroller, particularly in the more judgmental value for money sphere and in relation to the outsourcing of audit work."
	His concern is that that body will have some influence on the CAG. The Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee made it clear how important it is that there is independence for the CAG and how important, therefore, the appointment structure is. There is a role for the NAO in the approval of strategy and in the provision of resources. The concern is whether the Executive, through the chair of the NAO board, could influence the CAG.
	The other concern is that if the chairman of the NAO board is strong, there is a risk of interference. If he or she is weak, what is the point? Is this merely a distraction of management effort—of effort by the CAG—that could otherwise be focused on other things? I hope it is helpful to the Committee for me to put those concerns on the record and give the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee an opportunity to respond, although in some respects he addressed those concerns in his earlier remarks.

Philip Dunne: I endorse my hon. Friend's tentative concerns and shall start where he finished—on the extent to which international bodies look to the NAO as a beacon of light in the scrutiny of public expenditure. I have personal experience of the issue from my time on the Public Accounts Committee and, latterly, as a governor of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. We have entered the Westminster Consortium, a relationship with several other parties that are involved in parliamentary strengthening, and one of them is the NAO. Earlier today, we had an away-day to talk about how we can do more, working together, to spread best practice from this Parliament to other Parliaments throughout the world. It is very valuable work, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and Governments throughout the world recognise it as such. Although we may think that we are dealing with legislation in isolation, we should not forget that others will look at and, perhaps, imitate the structures that we are putting in place to provide for the NAO's corporate governance over, I hope, the next decades. In that context, it is right that we raise concerns about the proposal.
	I do not have concerns in principle, because they were well addressed earlier in the debate by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. However, we must recognise that, essentially, we are introducing a corporate governance structure to an entity that is not a corporate: it is an entity with a chief executive, in the form of the Comptroller and Auditor General, who quite rightly has enshrined in statute a degree of independence and autonomy in terms of his work on audit and value for money, as my hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Swansea, West (Mr. Williams), the Chairman of the Public Accounts Commission clearly explained.

Philip Dunne: I completely understand that point and am grateful for that clarification. Indeed, as the Father of the House has just made clear, the purpose of the proposals was to deal with deficiencies in the oversight and scrutiny of two simple things—the expenses and the duration of appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor General. To deal with those two relatively minor aspects, however, we have this substantial piece of legislation, and a new panoply of corporate governance that will be injected into the NAO.
	All I seek to do is point out to the Minister that we are establishing a panoply of corporate governance that could lead to confusion in the NAO, when all that is required is the scrutiny of those two aspects: the longevity of appointment, about which there is no disagreement at all; and, the board's oversight of expenses and NAO organisation, which may be rather more demanding than was intended of the organisation's time.

Alan Williams: The hon. Gentleman is right in what he said about expenses. We virtually dealt with that by having the CAG look at the expenses proposals and come to see me about them. However, the problem of governance was not just about expenses—it was about the staff of the organisation, who, as the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee indicated, were dependent on the good will of the CAG for their advancement, salary increases and so on. There was a much wider and more dangerous governance problem that could damage the organisation.

Philip Dunne: I am grateful for that clarification. I understand the need to put in place structures to help the internal career progression for senior people in the organisation, if that is what the right hon. Gentleman is seeking to achieve.
	I am not as concerned about what the role of the CAG will be in this new construct as about what the role of the chairman of the board will be. Of course, there is already a chairman in place; he was appointed before the Bill was drafted, so although he may have had some idea of what would be in the legislation, he took on the position without knowing for certain what was involved. My concern—this comes back to the definition in schedule 6 rather than clause 38—is about how the chairman is going to find a worthwhile function for himself in chairing a board where he has very little power other than to check the expenses of the chief executive.

Edward Leigh: Perhaps I can explain how the National Audit Office will work as a corporate entity. As such, it will be constituted as a board comprising five non-executive members, including its chair, and four executive members, including the Comptroller and Auditor General, who will also be its chief executive. The board's role, in essence, will be to develop a strategy for the office as a whole, not a strategy for audit judgments or to tell the CAG what to investigate: that is absolutely clear. The board's role will be to secure funding for the Public Accounts Commission, to monitor the delivery of the overall strategy and to report publicly on what is being achieved.
	As I have already said—but it is worth putting it on the record because Professor Heald has made these comments—the CAG's statutory audit responsibilities are completely ring-fenced; they are not transferred to the board. The board has nothing to say about or to do with his statutory audit functions. The Bill will merely ensure that in future these activities are carried out within the governance of the NAO as a whole, as a modern and robust organisation. The relationship with the CAG and the board will be regulated by code, which, under the terms of the Bill, will be approved by the Public Accounts Commission.
	I believe that the CAG—this is what he has told me—will benefit from the engagement of non-executives. Indeed, in so far as has been possible, the CAG has started to operate the new arrangements on a voluntary basis. The non-executives have already been appointed, and I understand from the CAG that they have already made a helpful contribution to the development of the strategy. In relation to the establishment of the NAO as a corporate entity, I am satisfied that sufficient safeguards are in place to reconcile sound governance with audit independence.
	I want to put on the record an important point made by Professor Heald. Let us think of the fantastical notion that the Government might put some sort of pressure on the chairman of the board to circumscribe the independence of the CAG. That is extremely unlikely. However, even if the Government attempted it, and even if the chairman listened to their advice, which is also extremely unlikely—why should he?—the CAG could ignore it. I do not know where Professor Heald is coming from.
	Even if there were a problem, the CAG would have the right of access straight to the commission. We are not circumventing the commission's powers. It, not the Government, sets the budget of the NAO. Say the CAG were to make critical remarks about the Government. Would the Government have any say over the budget of the NAO? No. Uniquely for a Government body, its budget is set by an independent Committee of this House, the Public Accounts Commission, which by the way is not the client of the NAO. The client of the NAO is the Public Accounts Committee, and that is why the commission sets the budget.
	I am afraid that I have to put it on record—it is very important—that Professor Heald is wrong. We are not in any way circumscribing the independence of the CAG, and I am glad that we have had this debate so that we can put that on the record.

David Gauke: I beg to move amendment 57, in clause 40, page 20, line 20, at end insert—
	'(10) All remuneration, allowances and expenses in relation to P must be published monthly online.'.
	In relation to the clause and the amendment, P refers to the Comptroller and Auditor General. As we have heard, the reform of the governance of the CAG has largely been driven, or provoked, by the difficulties regarding Sir John Bourn's expenses. As the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee said, there was a sticky patch. The amendment would address that in perhaps the simplest way possible—by introducing much greater transparency.
	There is obviously a sensitivity with regard to the CAG's remuneration and other expenses, given that his role is to identify waste in public spending. Therefore, it seems right that he should be assessed with great scrutiny. He should lead the way in moves towards scrutiny of public spending, which should include spending relating to him.
	If we have time—time is short again today—I hope we can have a longer debate on the wider issue of the transparency of public spending when we discuss part 8 of the Bill, but to ensure that the CAG is above suspicion, such information should be in the public domain.

David Gauke: The Father of the House makes a good point—the CAG is further ahead. On the whole, we believe there should be greater transparency in public spending, and the CAG could be yet further ahead. I accept that he submits expenses to the Father of the House in his role as Chairman of the Public Accounts Commission, but by putting them in the public domain we would prevent any repetition of what happened with Sir John Bourn, even though such information goes into the public domain every six months.
	Our proposal is a matter of going further. As a rule, we think information on how public money is spent should be in the public domain and published online. The CAG in particular needs to be above suspicion.
	To avoid—I hope—the need for a separate stand part debate, clause 40 states:
	"P's package is to be determined jointly by the Prime Minister and the"
	Chairman
	"of the Committee of Public Accounts before the start of the appointment."
	There is a great deal of flexibility within the clause, which is welcome and sensible, because there are dangers in being too prescriptive, depending on the nature of the CAG candidate. However, we are lucky enough to have the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee in the Chamber, and perhaps he is in a position to say something further on the thinking behind the package. For example, there has been talk about linking it to the salary of the Treasury permanent secretary or the Lord Chief Justice. Historically, there was a link with High Court judges. We have to recognise that we want to get the right person, and pay in the private sector for audit work has increased substantially over the past 20 or 30 years or so. If the CAG is not paid enough, it will have a knock-on effect on everyone else working in the NAO. It is important to get the figure right so that we get the right people.
	It is also right that no performance-related pay is included. It was recommended by the Tiner review, but it could lead to some sort of influence being put on the CAG. The proposals do everything they can to preserve the independence of the CAG and that is welcome. Subject to those queries, we have no objection to the clause, other than to say that it would be strengthened by amendment 57 to put on a statutory basis the publication online of details of the remuneration, allowances and other expenses of the CAG.

Edward Leigh: I am fairly relaxed about amendment 57. The CAG publishes details already of all his expenses and allowances. The commission had a discussion about the pay. It is true that traditionally the CAG has received the same salary as a High Court judge. We did not think that that was appropriate any more, because that is fixed and, in order to get a very high-calibre candidate, it might be necessary to pay more than that. When we put in the advertisement, we said that the package would be broadly in the permanent secretary range. That is an attractive salary, and it is useful to do it that way, because permanent secretaries are paid between £140,000 and £230,000 a year.
	There was some discussion about whether we should link the pay to that of the Lord Chief Justice. Personally, I liked that idea, because I am convinced—having done my job for eight years—of the very great importance of the CAG. It would have sent a message if we had made that link, but I suspect that the Treasury was not entirely happy with that. So we reached a compromise. It is not necessary for me to say in Committee what the CAG actually earns—it is published, it is a good salary and we got a high-calibre candidate.
	Finally, it is important that the CAG, like permanent secretaries, should not be subject to appraisal by anybody and he should not receive any bonuses. The best approach is the one that we have taken—with the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee working with the Prime Minister to set a good salary at the level of a permanent secretary. Let us stick to that. It can go up every year by inflation, but no bonuses should be paid and no appraisal made. That is part of the CAG's independence.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: Of course, we share everybody's wishes for greater transparency, and, as has been said by many Members, the CAG has been leading the way on that. At an administrative level, the NAO already provides for advance approval of the CAG's expenses by a non-executive member of its audit committee, with recourse to the Public Accounts Commission if necessary. Expenses are discussed with the chairman of the NAO audit committee in advance, and the CAG expenses follow, as far as possible, permanent secretary rules. In addition, since 2007, the expenses and hospitality records of all NAO senior managers, including the CAG, have been published on its websites for each six-month period. We welcome that commitment to transparency.
	The CAG's remuneration package is set before he takes office and then has effect for the full term of office, subject only to uprating, which is permitted, but only in line with a predetermined formula. As was mentioned, the current range for a civil service permanent secretary is fairly wide—a minimum of £140,000 to a maximum of £273,000. In the interests of transparency, I have no objection to saying that Mr. Morse is being paid £210,000 per annum, which is mid-range. The CAG's remuneration is reported in the NAO annual report and accounts. Given that it will change only once a year, in line with the annual uprating formula, I see no great advantage in requiring the NAO to report each month on the salary.
	The other information that hon. Members wish to be published is available already on the NAO website, albeit only six-monthly, not monthly. I think that six months is fine, given that there has to be advance approval for it, so I do not think that the amendment is necessary. I ask the hon. Gentleman to consider withdrawing it.

David Howarth: The amendments relate to discrepancies between the contents of the Bill and the Public Accounts Commission report. I want to give the Government an opportunity to explain the difference between the two.
	Amendments 29 and 30 are simply about who is to be consulted before the Comptroller and Auditor General is allowed to undertake any further employment after the end of his period in office. The commission said that the Advisory Committee on Public Appointments had to be consulted, whereas the Bill says that some "specified person" who will be
	"specified from time to time by the Commission"
	must be consulted. The Bill is therefore less specific than the recommendation from the commission.
	Clearly, the provision is important, and public confidence in the office of Comptroller and Auditor General must be maintained. It is possible for conflicts of interest apparently to arise in almost any sort of future employment—not just in organisations previously subject to the audit powers of the Comptroller and Auditor General, to which the rest of the clause applies, but those in the private sector. My first question is "Why has that change been made?"
	My second question relates to an even bigger difference between the commission's recommendation and what is proposed in the Bill. It concerns circumstances in which the Comptroller and Auditor General, after leaving office, proposes to take up employment with a body that has previously been within his or her jurisdiction for the purposes of audit. The Bill imposes an absolute ban on such appointments for a limited period of two years.
	The commission, taking a much stricter view, suggested a lifelong ban, stating:
	"It is obviously essential that subsequent employment could not be seen as a reward for actions taken while C&AG, and for that reason there should be a lifetime prohibition on a C&AG or former C&AG accepting any post in any body which the NAO has audited or which is in the gift of the Government."
	Given the very proper concerns that have been expressed throughout the debate about the independence of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the commission's clear recommendation of a lifetime ban, I simply ask the Government why they have opted for such a short period.

David Howarth: Yes, of course I will seek leave to withdraw amendment 29, and I thank the Government and the Father of the House for the explanation offered as to the change. It makes sense for this provision to be more flexible and to take into account the chance that the appropriate body to consult might change.
	I shall not be pressing amendment 31 to a Division either, but the explanation that the Minister offered is slightly puzzling, in that the chances of this indirect discrimination happening and affecting anybody are remote. As I understand it, the argument put forward was that as a younger person would face a longer ban, in terms of years, than an older person, disproportionately more younger people, as opposed to older people, would be put off and that would therefore qualify as indirect discrimination on age grounds against the young. I suppose that is theoretically possible in some remote circumstance, but it does not strike me as the most obvious discrimination case that anyone would bring, especially when one considers the consequence of bringing such a case for one's career.
	The reason for the two-year ban has not been entirely explained. The Minister mentioned the possibility of a five-year ban—I am not entirely clear about in what circumstances the commission suggested a five-year ban—but she did not offer any particular reasoning as to why the ban should be for two years, rather than for five. Given that the whole point of this clause is to maintain public confidence in the neutrality and independence of the CAG, if anything we should err on the side of caution.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I beg to move amendment 42, page 71, line 20, at end insert—
	 'Government of Wales Act 2006 (c. 32)22A In paragraphs 5 and 8 of Schedule 5 after "Comptroller and Auditor General" insert "or the National Audit Office".'.
	This is a minor and consequential measure. If part 7 is enacted, certain functions carried out by the Comptroller and Auditor General will in future be carried out by the new National Audit Office. The amendment will prevent the provision of an Assembly measure from modifying the functions of the National Audit Office without the consent of the Secretary of State. A similar provision already applies in relation to the functions of the Comptroller and Auditor General.
	 Amendment 42 agreed to.
	 Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.
	 Clause 50 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

'(1) Schedule 5 to the Government of Wales Act 2006 (c. 32) is amended as follows.
	(2) In Part 1, under Field 14, insert—
	 "Matter 14.1
	(1) The following aspects of the Auditor General's terms of appointment—
	(a) the period of the appointment;
	(b) salary, allowances and superannuation benefits;
	(c) pensions and gratuities payable after a person has ceased to hold the office.
	(2) The number of times a person may be appointed to the office of Auditor General.
	(3) Restrictions on the other offices and positions which may be held by the person who is the Auditor General; activities of a person who has held the office of Auditor General (but no longer does).
	(4) Provision requiring the Auditor General—
	(a) to aim to do things efficiently and cost-effectively;
	(b) to have regard, as the Auditor General thinks appropriate, to the standards and principles that an expert professional provider of accounting or auditing services would be expected to apply.
	(5) The authorisation of persons to exercise functions of the Auditor General on the Auditor General's behalf (including during a vacancy in the office).
	(6) The oversight or supervision of the Auditor General or of the exercise of the Auditor General's functions.
	(7) The provision or use of resources for the purposes of the Auditor General's functions including (in particular)—
	(a) the employment and use of staff;
	(b) the procurement and use of services;
	(c) the holding of documents or information;
	(d) the keeping of records.
	(8) The charging of fees or other amounts in relation to functions of—
	(a) the Auditor General, or
	(b) auditors appointed by the Auditor General under enactments.
	(9) The restatement of any law relating to the Auditor General."
	(3) In Part 2, after paragraph 6, insert—
	"6A (1) This paragraph applies to a provision of an Assembly Measure which—
	(a) is a Matter 14.1 provision;
	(b) provides for the enforcement of a Matter 14.1 provision or is otherwise appropriate for making a Matter 14.1 provision effective;
	(c) is otherwise incidental to, or consequential on, a Matter 14.1 provision.
	"Matter 14.1 provision" means a provision which relates to Matter 14.1 (and section 94(7) applies for the purposes of this definition as it applies for the purposes of section 94).
	(2) The following provisions do not apply in relation to a provision to which this paragraph applies—
	(a) paragraph 3 so far as it applies in relation to sections 145, 145A and 146A(1) of the Government of Wales Act 1998;
	(b) paragraph 6(1).
	(3) Subject to sub-paragraph (4), a provision to which this paragraph applies cannot—
	(a) modify or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify paragraph 3 of Schedule 8, or
	(b) give or confer power by subordinate legislation to give any role to a committee of the Assembly.
	(4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not limit any role which may be given to a committee of the Assembly which meets the requirements in sub-paragraph (5) (whether established by virtue of a provision to which this paragraph applies or otherwise).
	(5) The requirements are—
	(a) none of the following may be a member of the committee—
	(i) the First Minister or any person designated to exercise functions of the First Minister;
	(ii) a Welsh Minister appointed under section 48;
	(iii) the Counsel General or any person designated to exercise the functions of the Counsel General;
	(iv) a Deputy Welsh Minister;
	(b) the committee must not be chaired by an Assembly member who is a member of a political group with an executive role.".'— (Mr. David.)
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

David Gauke: The Minister says that the delay was due to a technical difficulty. Will he reassure the Committee that it was not due to Wales being forgotten? We know that the Government's relationship with the Principality is not what it was—Labour is no longer the most popular political party in Wales—and I fear that this is an example of Welsh neglect.

'(1) The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866 is amended as follows.
	(2) In section 13(1) after "applies", insert ", subject to section 15A,".
	(3) In section 14 at the beginning insert "Subject to section 15A".
	(4) In section 15(1) after "applies", insert ", subject to section 15A,".
	(5) After section 15 insert—
	"15A Authorisation by relevant committee of the House of Commons
	Notwithstanding any Act of Parliament or Resolution of the House of Commons, the Auditor and Comptroller-General shall not grant any credit to the Treasury under this Act unless he is satisfied that a relevant committee of the House of Commons has examined and approved the expenditure concerned for the relevant year,"'.— (David Howarth.)
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

David Howarth: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
	It is something of a shame that a new clause that looks modest but would have the effect of changing our system of Government entirely comes before the Committee with only seven minutes to go before the knife. I therefore do not expect that it will get a proper airing or any proper debate tonight.
	The new clause deals with the control of expenditure by the House before that expenditure is made, as opposed to the auditing of expenditure once the money has been spent, which we tend to be rather better at. It is emblematic that most of this afternoon's debates on this part of the Bill have been about the Comptroller and Auditor General in his role as an auditor, rather than in his very important role as Comptroller.
	The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866, which is one of the great Gladstonian reforms of the 19th century, puts on the Comptroller the job of making sure that Government expenditure drawn from the Consolidated Fund is authorised by statute or by a resolution of the House. It is fundamental to the system of supply whereby the House, in theory, controls Government expenditure that the Comptroller has that job.
	This should matter because policy debates are intimately connected with expenditure. A great American political scientist, Aaron Wildavsky, once said that policy is expenditure and expenditure is policy. That is because a policy that does not have any resources attached to it is generally just hot air, and any spending decision is, in reality, a decision about what to spend money on, as opposed to not spending money on something else, and therefore is a policy decision.
	Over the past couple of centuries we have seen a great decline in the practical control of the House over that sort of expenditure decision. There is no time tonight to go through the detailed history of the decline of the supply procedure of the House. By 1896 most of the remaining power of the House was removed by the Conservative party when Mr. Balfour, who was Leader of the House, decided to change the procedure so that all the Government's supply requirements would be decided on one day in August, just in time for the grouse shooting season to start.
	The main purpose of the clause is to suggest to the House—I am sure that the Government will not be interested—that it is now time to try in some way to wrest back our control over Government expenditure before it happens. An important consequence of the House's giving up of its power over supply and expenditure is that it spends all its time talking about legislation instead. This problem is part of the wider problem of there being far too much legislation. What has filled the time that in previous centuries was taken up with discussing Government expenditure before it happened is legislation—new laws. That is what we talk about instead.
	I admit that the new clause would not make a vast difference in itself. We need to get hold not just of the annual process of Government expenditure, but of the comprehensive spending review—the multi-year framework which is generally a process from which we are entirely excluded. Select Committees find themselves excluded from that as well.
	In local government, the systems for controlling expenditure in advance are far better. Even the smallest parish council gives the elected representatives better information and more power over spending decisions than happens in the House. In the end that lack of control leads to worse policy. There is not time to go into the details of what would be different if control were different. I simply leave hon. Members with the thought that the House is withering in its power and in public esteem, and that it will continue to wither until it takes back a role in the setting of policy. That is what the control of expenditure in advance is all about.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I thank the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) for his contribution, which reflects his passionate views that the House should have better scrutiny of Government spending for future years. I know that that was one of the themes of his speech on Second Reading, in which he said that serious reform was required of the way in which Parliament relates to Government on money issues.
	The hon. Gentleman will know that the Government published a memorandum in March containing formal proposals to Parliament for better alignment between budgets, estimates and accounts. The memorandum explained the plans to simplify the Government's financial reporting to Parliament, ensuring that they report in a more consistent, transparent and straightforward fashion on spending plans, estimates and expenditure outcomes.
	The hon. Gentleman will know that an important plank in moving towards alignment is covered by part 8, on the transparency of Government financial reporting and, in particular, the inclusion in departmental estimates of resources used by designated bodies.
	On 3 July, the Liaison Committee responded to the memorandum on behalf of the other Select Committees, and in its response it covered some of the same ground as the hon. Gentleman has. In particular—
	 Debate interrupted (Programme Order, 3 November).
	 The Chairman put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair (Standing Order No. 83D), That the new clause be added to the Bill.
	 Question put and negatived.
	 The Chairman then put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83D).
	 Clause 51 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	 Clause 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	 The Chairman left the Chair to report progress and ask leave to sit again (Programme Order, 3 November).
	 The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.
	 Progress reported; Committee to sit again tomorrow.

That the draft Provision of Services Regulations 2009, which were laid before this House on 12 October, be approved.— (Mary Creagh.)
	 Question agreed to.

Motion made and Question put ,
	That Ms Karen Buck, Jeremy Corbyn, Clive Efford, Siobhain McDonagh and Mr Andy Slaughter be members of the London Regional Select Committee.— (Mary Creagh . )

Resumption of adjourned debate on Question (2 November),
	That Mr David Kidney be discharged from the West Midlands Regional Select Committee and Mrs Janet Dean be added. —(Mary Creagh .)

Resumption of adjourned debate on Question (29 October),
	That Linda Gilroy be discharged from the South West Regional Select Committee and Roger Berry be added.— (Mary Creagh.)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn. —(Mr. McAvoy.)

Madeleine Moon: I thank Mr. Speaker for giving me the opportunity to hold this debate.
	I am grateful to the Pernicious Anaemia Society for its help in preparing the debate. This small but ambitious charity is based in my constituency and has members throughout the world who are working to bring attention to this common but often misunderstood condition.
	First, I should like to say a few words about pernicious anaemia, its causes and consequences. The condition is caused by a lack of vitamin B12. Vitamin B12 cannot be produced or stored in the body, and deficiency is caused by a failure to absorb vitamin B12 from the diet. Vitamin B12 is vital for the manufacture of new red blood cells. When it is in short supply, red blood cells are produced in smaller numbers, are abnormally large in size—megaloblastic—and do not last as long as they should; and anaemia develops. While the peak incidence of pernicious anaemia occurs within the 60-plus demographic, it can afflict anyone at any age.
	The condition has physiological and mental symptoms. Common physical symptoms include tiredness, fatigue or lethargy; a shortage of breath known as "the sighs"; a swollen tongue and feeling bloated; brittle, easily damaged nails; pins and needles; unaccountable sudden diarrhoea; and an increased sensitivity to sound, scent and taste. Common mental symptoms include "the fogs"—a lack of clarity and focus in everything the sufferer experiences—and irritability, impatience and, often, mood swings. In addition, when vitamin B12 is low, the cells of the nervous and digestive systems may be affected. Undiagnosed or untreated, the condition can lead to damage to the central and peripheral nervous systems with separate symptoms and consequences in itself such as numbness in the limbs, especially the legs; vertigo; balance problems; inability to concentrate; and confusion or forgetfulness.
	The most common reason why pernicious anaemia sufferers develop nerve damage is that its insidious nature, coupled with its vague symptoms, can often lead to a late diagnosis. Consequently, nerve damage has often occurred before pernicious anaemia has been diagnosed. The severity of the symptoms depends on how much damage has been done to the central nervous system. Balance problems can make everyday tasks such as showering, dressing and walking a challenge.
	It is possible that these symptoms are irreversible, so diagnosis of pernicious anaemia needs to be quick and accurate. However, there are problems with its timely and accurate diagnosis. The disease shares common symptoms with a number of other conditions, and the fact that there is no single definitive test can often mean that a diagnosis is delayed. Many sufferers are misdiagnosed with conditions such as depression, multiple sclerosis, myalgic encephalomyelitis or chronic fatigue syndrome, or with being totally well but feeling unwell.
	For some sufferers, a simple blood test can diagnose anaemia and an examination of the red blood cells can determine whether they are larger than normal. If this is the case, a Schilling test, which measures the body's ability to absorb vitamin B12 from the bowel, can determine whether it is pernicious anaemia. However, the Schilling test is no longer widely available. For most people on a normal diet, especially the elderly, a Schilling test is not thought necessary. Instead, a blood test is done to measure levels of vitamin B12. If the levels are low, pernicious anaemia is presumed and treatment started. However, the testing regime is not sufficient for the diagnosis of all patients with pernicious anaemia.
	Typically, vitamin B12 deficiency is suspected when an individual presents with megaloblastic anaemia. However, that may occur only in the most severely vitamin B12-depleted individuals. As the Schilling test is no longer widely available, and the other main diagnostic signposts of low levels of serum B12 cannot be relied upon, sufferers can have high levels of serum B12 and still have pernicious anaemia.
	The intrinsic factor antibody test, which is used to determine whether the patient is able to absorb intrinsic factor B12 from food, is only about 30 per cent. accurate. A better method of determining whether a patient is B12-deficient is based on their active B12 level, because only active B12 plays a part in the complex biochemistry. If a patient's active B12 level is low, he or she will still have the symptoms of pernicious anaemia even though the total level of B12 will be above the lower threshold for determining deficiency. There is a newly developed test that takes that into account and is widely used in Australia and Germany. Many people there who were not previously considered to be B12-deficient now receive B12 injections, with considerable improvement to their quality of life.
	As well as difficulties in diagnosis, there are a number of other issues of concern to sufferers. Pernicious anaemia is treated in this country with injections of hydroxocobalamin, a form of vitamin B12. Patients receive three injections a week for the first two weeks, then one every three months for the rest of their life. More frequent regimes may be used in sufferers who have been diagnosed late and have neurological damage.
	The main concern for sufferers is that the UK practice limits patients to an injection every three months, which is not sufficient. In the 1960s the treatment was an intramuscular injection every month. That changed to one every two months in the 1970s and one every three months in the 1980s. The Pernicious Anaemia Society cannot find any evidence that those changes to the prescription were related to new clinical research.
	People with pernicious anaemia have widely different needs and respond differently to treatment. For some, an injection every three months is adequate, but for others, weekly or even daily injections may be required. In the UK, however, GPs on the whole stick to the three-monthly injections and feel that they are adequate. They generally refuse to allow more frequent injections. That means that sufferers often find themselves looking elsewhere for more regular sources of B12.
	In the UK, vitamin B12 in injectable form is available only on prescription, under the Medicines Act 1968. It is, however, available over the counter in most European countries and readily available using the internet. Many people with pernicious anaemia travel abroad to get top-up injections or order infusions over the internet. That situation is far from ideal, and I know that my hon. Friend the Minister will be horrified to learn about it. It is also extremely expensive and fraught with danger. I am sure that I am not alone in feeling uncomfortable with people ordering any medication over the internet.
	Many people with pernicious anaemia also seek help from the private sector, from which B12 infusions can be bought. The form of B12 used is methylcobalimin, an extremely pure form of the vitamin that can be injected straight into the bloodstream. The patient can self-inject using the same needles used by diabetics. Many sufferers claim that if they return to their doctor to request an additional dose of B12, they are offered antidepressants. However, B12 is a harmless vitamin with no side effects, and it is cheaper than antidepressants. The PAS argues that allowing sufferers to self-inject using insulin needles would free up valuable nursing time, saving money from the NHS budget, and provide patients with a treatment regime based on need. It calculates that £20 million a year could be saved in nursing time by allowing patients to self-inject.
	The PAS recently presented a petition to the Department of Health via the No. 10 e-petition system, highlighting the problems faced by people with the condition. In its response, the Department acknowledged:
	"Too often, people with long-term chronic conditions have been made to fit themselves into the way care is provided locally, regardless of whether that meets their individual needs."
	It went on to state:
	"Our changes to the NHS aim to deliver the right services where they are needed, working with all involved agencies to provide a seamless package of care."
	People with pernicious anaemia are being made to fit in with a treatment that is imposed from the top down. The national service framework for long-term conditions, launched in March 2005, focuses on improving services for people with long-term conditions across England. It states that comprehensive assessment and regular reviews of people's problems should be held and that self-referral would allow people to refer themselves quickly back to services as their care needs change. However, that has not materialised for people with pernicious anaemia.
	There are a number of ways that the Department of Health could improve the care provided to sufferers of pernicious anaemia, and a review of the disease's symptoms, diagnoses and treatment is needed. The current treatment regime would benefit from a review relating to its efficacy and cost-effectiveness. Modern, self-administered treatment regimes that are available should be evaluated to save medical staff time and to provide a more efficient treatment regime based on patients' needs.
	The misdiagnosis of pernicious anaemia could be reduced by launching an education campaign for general practitioners. It should also be made clear that the current three-monthly injection cycle may not address the needs of every patient and that it should be more flexible. Any review could include a study investigating the feasibility of a return to the monthly dose, which was successfully administered with no side effect to a generation of sufferers in the 1960s.
	The review should consider the type of B12 that could be used. Methylcobalamin, which is used in the private sector, is a purer form of B12 that absorbs in the body with better results. The PAS would like sufferers who have a more severe form of pernicious anaemia to have the option of self-injecting daily doses of B12 methylcobalamin. Monitoring such a regime would reveal whether it could be a modern way forward, in which patients can opt for a treatment style that is similar to diabetic provision. It would be helpful if the Department could support the creation of a charity helpline for sufferers, compile the statistics of current misdiagnosis and create a referral service so that sufferers can find the correct medical attention quickly.
	The disease affects people in all right hon. and hon. Members' constituencies. An early-day motion highlighting many of the issues raised, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, North-West (Dr. Naysmith), has received 73 signatures. I hope the Department considers acting on many of the issues that I have raised this evening. I also hope that it will agree to a future meeting of officials and members of the PAS, so that their concerns can be adequately addressed.

Ann Keen: May I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs. Moon) on securing this debate, which is of course on an important subject? Her constituency has the honour of having the PAS in it, and I am aware of her work with society. She has taken a very close interest in pernicious anaemia and has previously tabled questions on behalf of patients who have that distressing condition.
	As my hon. Friend has so eloquently described the condition, I will not go into the details again, but there are some rarer causes of vitamin B12 deficiency. The root cause of pernicious anaemia, however, is the deficiency of B12 due to the lack of what is known as the "intrinsic factor" needed for its absorption.
	The inability to absorb vitamin B12 orally means that treatment in an injectable form is required, and because the lack of the intrinsic factor cannot be reversed, treatment must be continued for life. That is to avoid the problems associated with uncorrected anaemia as well as the possibility of damage to the central nervous system that can result from prolonged vitamin B12 deficiency.
	My hon. Friend mentioned the role of GPs. In common with a wide range of chronic conditions, the diagnosis and treatment of pernicious anaemia is generally best carried out at primary care level. It is for general practitioners to diagnose the condition, arrange for blood tests and prescribe the treatment that they consider most appropriate. General practice and primary care have increasingly showed themselves to be the preferred settings for discussing and deciding on such treatments, and patients' preference has been supported by increased investment by this Government in a wide range of programmes to expand services locally.
	I recall my days as a district nurse when I provided this facility locally to one of my patients who was a pig farmer. He was reluctant to come to the surgery, so the district nurse went to the pig farm. In fact, the patient was very reluctant to leave the pigs, so—in true district nurse style—my wellingtons came out of the boot of my car and I performed the service where the patient thought it most appropriate. I then went into the farmhouse to wash my hands and was given a cauliflower for my trouble. I remember those days with great warmth, but the advancement in primary care has made it much more possible for patients with chronic conditions to be treated at home or very close to home.
	It has been suggested that GPs are insufficiently aware of the prevalence of pernicious anaemia that they may fail to diagnose the condition and that the Department of Health should take steps to increase awareness. However, assessments of medical professionals and their awareness of conditions such as pernicious anaemia are not matters for the Department of Health. It would be for the relevant specialist professional bodies, such as the Royal College of Pathologists, to provide guidance and professional development on matters relating to haematology. The Department of Health has not issued any recent guidance to general practitioners on the diagnosis or treatment of pernicious anaemia. Nor has the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, to whom the task has now been given.
	I am aware that some patients take the view that injections should be offered more frequently, or that other treatments should be offered, and that patients may become understandably very distressed if they believe that their individual needs are not being taken fully into account. Some of the examples that my hon. Friend gave are very worrying. However, I do think that in this and in other cases, we must rely on GPs using their training, professional judgement and the evidence available to them to decide what treatment they consider appropriate, taking into account the particular needs of the person concerned. I hope that the Pernicious Anaemia Society stresses to its members that they must go to their GP and have a proper clinical assessment.
	I know of the work of the Pernicious Anaemia Society in raising public awareness of pernicious anaemia and also of its proposals concerning diagnosis and treatment of the condition. I am aware that the PAS organised a parliamentary reception last week, and I apologise again to my hon. Friend for being unable to attend. The early-day motion in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, North-West (Dr. Naysmith) has attracted over 70 signatures. It raises five main points and it may be helpful if I respond to each of these in turn, before covering the other points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend.
	The early-day motion states that there are fundamental problems with the diagnosis and treatment of vitamin B12 deficiency and pernicious anaemia. When vitamin B12 deficiency has caused anaemia, its diagnosis is not generally difficult, and I am not aware of significant problems of under-recognition. What people sometimes say, however, is that they felt unwell for some time before developing anaemia, and they attribute that to the early stages of vitamin B12 deficiency. Although that may be true, the difficulties of very widespread testing of the many patients with non-specific malaise and tiredness that would be necessary to detect a few people with very early vitamin B12 deficiency make this unlikely ever to be an appropriate policy. When anaemia is present, my understanding is that most patients respond well to treatment through quarterly injections of vitamin B12 and are able to get on with their lives, despite the inconvenience. I am aware of the discomfort of regular treatment and the impact of the condition. I am told that the injection is very painful because of the nature of what is being injected.
	I am aware that some individuals with pernicious anaemia do not believe that sufficient heed is paid to their particular wishes regarding the nature and frequency of treatment. However, that is a matter for clinicians and patients to decide, taking into account personal circumstances, and professional knowledge and experience. Some patients might wish to play a greater role in their own care, and I would encourage that. The personal experiences of individual patients need to be a significant factor in these discussions and decisions about treatment.
	The early-day motion calls for a review of the efficacy and cost effectiveness of current treatment for pernicious anaemia. The Government established the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence to provide authoritative, independent advice to the NHS on different health-related interventions and forms of care. That is to increase fairness in access to treatments, to be a national source of robust clinical guidance and to speed up the uptake of cost-effective treatments in the NHS.
	There is a clear process for the selection of topics for referral to NICE's work programme and final decisions on that work programme are taken by Ministers. I understand that a number of topic suggestions have been made around the diagnosis and management of pernicious anaemia, including one from the PAS itself. NICE is considering those proposed topics against its published criteria for possible inclusion in future work. However, I hope that my hon. Friend appreciates that NICE cannot advise on every condition or aspect of treatment, and that this topic will need to be considered alongside all the other competing priorities for NICE guidance.
	The early-day motion calls for pernicious anaemia to be included within the national service framework for long-term conditions. As my hon. Friend is aware, we published the framework in 2005. It is a 10-year plan to address inequities in access, a lack of integrated service provision, work force shortages—if there are any—and variations in the quality of care across the country. The framework focuses on neurological conditions, and its quality requirements are based on evidence from services for people with neurological conditions. That focus on neurology highlights and sets in a clear context issues that are also relevant to the millions of people living with other long-term conditions, including pernicious anaemia.
	I understand that the early-day motion proposes that treatment for pernicious anaemia should be more flexible and responsive to the needs of patients. The Government are committed to supporting patients in taking control of their own health and in the management of their own care. I am aware that some patients with pernicious anaemia might prefer to have more frequent injections or other forms of vitamin B12 to be administered by patients. Again, however, I am sure that my hon. Friend will understand that those are matters for individual patients to discuss with their general practitioners; it is not for the Department of Health to specify regimes of care in general practice—thank goodness!
	The early-day motion also proposes that there should be a review of symptoms, diagnosis and treatment. As I have said, since coming into office in 1997, the Government have established a series of national service frameworks and other clinical strategies looking at diagnosis and treatment of major diseases. Through the NSF approach, we have substantially improved mortality rates and eased the burden of ill health caused by major diseases.
	We recently announced our intention to produce a clinical service strategy for liver disease and we will shortly be publishing a draft strategy for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. However, we are aware that not every service area can be identified as a priority suitable for a national service framework or clinical service strategy. That has been recognised in the establishment of the National Quality Board, which is a key element of the NHS next stage review led by Lord Darzi. All recommendations for service reviews or strategies must now be considered by the National Quality Board, which will advise the Government.
	This is a long overdue debate, which my hon. Friend has been requesting for some time. I congratulate her on raising the subject. I also welcome the activities of the Pernicious Anaemia Society in raising awareness of the condition among the public and clinicians. The society may wish to make representations to NICE about the review of treatments for the condition and to the National Quality Board. I acknowledge my hon. Friend's request for the society to meet officials and I will ask officials to arrange that at the earliest opportunity.
	Most people who have developed pernicious anaemia receive excellent support from their GPs in diagnosis, treatment and other forms of support. However, I cannot let this debate end without mentioning the district nurses, whom I believe will support their patients in the community to the best of their ability and follow the example set by this Minister, because patients are patients, wherever they happen to be.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 House adjourned.